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SOLAR FINANCING IN NORTH CAROLINA: 
THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF POWER 
PURCHASE AGREEMENTS* 
ANDREW J. HAILE** 
Clean, renewable energy is an essential component of a modern 
energy policy. Rooftop solar photovoltaic (“PV”) systems 
constitute an important part of a state’s clean energy portfolio. 
But these systems are too expensive for most individuals and 
small businesses to buy outright. Instead, they must be financed. 
One of the main methods used in other states for financing 
rooftop solar PV systems is the power purchase agreement 
(“PPA”). Under a typical PPA, a third-party financier installs a 
solar PV system on a property owner’s rooftop and sells the 
electricity generated by the system to the property owner. The 
price for the electricity is usually lower than the price charged by 
the property owner’s public utility. But the North Carolina 
Utilities Commission (the “Utilities Commission”) has 
prohibited the use of PPAs in North Carolina. According to the 
Utilities Commission, the sale of electricity by a third-party 
financier under a PPA violates the competitive monopoly 
granted under state law to the public utility. 
 
This prohibition against PPA will slow the spread of rooftop 
solar PV systems in North Carolina. In addition to the 
detrimental environmental effects this will have, there are also 
equitable effects. Without PPAs, only the wealthy are able to 
afford the economic benefits and environmental stewardship 
resulting from solar ownership. 
 
This Article contends that PPAs do not implicate the traditional 
justifications for regulation by the Utilities Commission and are 
therefore outside the Commission’s authority to prohibit. The 
Article also offers both a legislative and a judicial solution to the 
current prohibition against PPAs in North Carolina. 
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 **  Associate Professor, Elon University School of Law. This Article is dedicated to 
my friend and colleague, Michael L. Rich, whose innovative and humorous spirit 
continues to inspire those who had the privilege of working with him. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
In December 2014, Faith Community Church, a historically 
African-American church located in Greensboro, North Carolina, 
entered into an agreement with the North Carolina Waste Reduction 
and Awareness Network (“NC WARN”), a non-profit, 
environmental organization.1 The agreement called for NC WARN to 
install a solar photovoltaic (“PV”) system on the roof of the church.2 
According to the terms of the agreement, known as a “power 
 
 1. See N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP-
100, SUB 31, at 1, 18 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n June 17, 2015) (Request for Declaratory 
Ruling). 
 2. Id. at 1. 
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purchase agreement” (“PPA”), NC WARN would pay the significant 
upfront cost of the solar PV system and would sell the electricity 
produced to the church at a reduced rate compared to the rate 
charged by the church’s public utility, Duke Energy Carolinas (“Duke 
Energy”).3 Without this arrangement, the church would not have 
been able to afford the high cost of purchasing and installing the solar 
panels on its own.4 The arrangement would lower the church’s 
electricity expenses and better allow it to meet its mission of “striving 
to be good stewards of God’s earth.”5 In turn, the stream of payments 
would enable NC WARN to replicate this type of arrangement with 
other churches, supporting its goal of reducing carbon output and 
slowing climate change.6 The PPA benefited both parties. 
In April 2016, however, the North Carolina Utilities Commission 
(the “Utilities Commission” or “Commission”) struck down the 
arrangement and ordered NC WARN to pay a fine of “$200 per day 
for each day that NC WARN has provided and continues to provide 
electric service to the Church.”7 Despite the fact that at the time of 
 
 3. Id. at 1–2. The PPA between Faith Community Church and NC WARN called for 
NC WARN to sell to the church electricity produced by the PV system at a rate of $0.05 
per kilowatt hour (“kWh”). N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), 
Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 1 n.1 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 
1572367, at *1 n.1 (Order Issuing Declaratory Ruling). This is approximately half the price 
of electricity sold by Duke Energy. See DUKE ENERGY PROGRESS, LLC, SMALL 
GENERAL SERVICE SCHEDULE 1 (2017), https://www.duke-energy.com/_/media/pdfs/for-
your-home/rates/electric-nc/g1ncschedulesgsdep.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/VS5X-UQME]. 
 4. Telephone Interview with Nelson Johnson, Reverend, Faith Community Church 
(Nov. 1, 2016). The inability to afford the full cost of a solar PV system up front is 
common. See e.g., STEFAN LINDER & MICHEL DI CAPUA, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY 
FIN., RE-IMAGINING US SOLAR FINANCING 1 (2012), https://financere.nrel.gov/finance
/content/re-imagining-us-solar-financing [https://perma.cc/EAW7-W85Z] (“Few homeowners 
can afford the upfront cost of a solar system, giving rise to third-party financing models, 
which allow them to ‘go solar’ with little or no money down.”). 
 5. NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 2 (Request for Declaratory Ruling). 
Attention to stewardship of natural resources has taken on increased importance in 
various faith traditions. See, e.g., POPE FRANCIS, LAUDATO SI’ (2015), http://w2.vatican.va
/content/dam/francesco/pdf/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-
laudato-si_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DAX-XGGS]. 
 6. See NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 2 (Request for Declaratory 
Ruling) (“Such a funding mechanism could potentially generate a revolving revenue 
stream and allow NC WARN to provide similar projects to other non-profits in the 
future.”). NC WARN states that its mission as “tackling the climate crisis – and other 
hazards posed by electricity generation – by watch-dogging Duke Energy practices and 
building people power for a swift North Carolina transition to clean, renewable and 
affordable power generation and increased energy efficiency.” See Mission, NC WARN, 
http://www.ncwarn.org/about-us/mission/ [https://perma.cc/WRB8-BEKL]. 
 7. See NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 31, 2016 WL 1572367, at *31 
(Order Issuing Declaratory Ruling). The Utilities Commission suspended the fine 
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the Utilities Commission’s decision NC WARN had entered into only 
one, specially-negotiated power purchase agreement (the one with 
Faith Community Church), the Utilities Commission found that the 
sale of electricity by NC WARN to the church under the PPA 
rendered NC WARN a “public utility” under North Carolina law.8 As 
a public utility, NC WARN was subject to regulation and oversight by 
the Utilities Commission. Moreover, by selling electricity from the 
solar PV system to the church, NC WARN had violated the exclusive 
franchise9 granted by the Utilities Commission to Duke Energy to sell 
electricity “to or for the public” in Greensboro.10 The Utilities 
Commission’s decision that NC WARN, and by extension any 
financing parties under future PPAs, was a public utility effectively 
foreclosed the use of power purchase agreements in North Carolina. 
The Utilities Commission’s decision is currently on appeal before the 
Court of Appeals of North Carolina.11 
In other states, PPAs constitute one of the primary means of 
financing on-site solar PV systems and have been used without 
detrimental effects to electric utilities or consumers. On-site solar PV 
systems are a key component of “distributed generation” systems, 
 
conditioned upon the non-profit returning all payments with ten percent interest to the 
church and donating the solar panels to the church. Id. at 32, 2016 WL 1572367, at *32. 
 8. Id. at 28–29, 2016 WL 1572367, at *28–29. 
 9. North Carolina’s Public Utilities Act defines “franchise” as “the grant of authority 
by the [Utilities] Commission to any person to engage in business as a public utility, 
whether or not exclusive or shared with others or restricted as to terms and conditions and 
whether described by area or territory or not, and includes certificates, and all other forms 
of licenses or orders and decisions granting such authority.” N.C. GEN. STAT. §	62-3(11) 
(2015). 
 10. Duke’s exclusive franchise extends to several areas in North Carolina, including 
the state’s most populous urban centers. The exclusive franchise was assigned to Duke 
pursuant to the Territorial Assignment Act of 1965. See Territorial Assignment Act of 
1965, ch. 287, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 328, 328–41 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	62-110.2 
(relating to electric service outside the corporate limits of municipalities) and §§	160A-331 
to -338 (relating to electric service within the corporate limits of municipalities)); see also 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §	160A-334 (authorizing the North Carolina Utilities Commission to 
order a “secondary supplier” of electricity, such as NC WARN, to cease and desist in the 
provision of electricity to a consumer in a region assigned to a “primary supplier,” such as 
Duke Energy). As explained by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, the purpose of 
the Territorial Assignment Act of 1965 was “to eliminate the ‘uneconomic duplication of 
transmission and distribution systems’ bred of unbridled competition between public 
utilities, electric membership corporations and municipalities by designating the various 
competitors’ rights.” Morgan v. Hertford, 70 N.C. App. 725, 727, 321 S.E.2d 170, 172 
(1984) (quoting Domestic Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Rocky Mount, 285 N.C. 135, 203 S.E.2d 838 
(1974)). 
 11. See N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP-
100, SUB 31, at 1–7 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n May 16, 2016) (Notice of Appeal and 
Exceptions). 
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which produce electricity at or near the location where it is used, 
rather than at a centralized generation facility.12 Distributed 
generation through the use of on-site (typically rooftop) solar PV 
systems is known as “distributed solar.”13 The decision to eliminate 
the use of PPAs in North Carolina will slow the spread of distributed 
solar in the state. This will have detrimental environmental and 
equitable effects. More distributed solar would allow for a reduction 
in the use of electricity produced by coal-fired power plants.14 This 
would, in turn, reduce carbon emissions and help to slow climate 
change. Additionally, a reduction on the reliance of electricity from 
coal-fired plants may help to avoid the type of environmental disaster 
experienced by residents of Stokes County in February 2014, when 
39,000 tons of coal ash from Duke Energy’s Dan River Steam Station 
spilled into the Dan River.15 
In addition, because the North Carolina statutes allow an 
exclusion from the definition of “public utility” for consumers who 
can afford to self-finance their on-site solar PV systems,16 prohibiting 
PPAs prevents only those who lack the means to self-finance PV 
systems from enjoying the economic and environmental-stewardship 
benefits of solar-generated electricity. By prohibiting PPAs in North 
Carolina, environmental stewardship and lower-cost, clean electricity 
have been limited to the “haves” and kept beyond the reach of the 
“have-nots.”17 
This Article examines the practical, legal, and policy issues 
involved in financing on-site solar PV systems through PPAs. Part I 
starts by giving a brief overview of the economics of distributed solar 
production. Part II reviews the statutory and case law background as 
to what constitutes a “public utility” under North Carolina law. Part 
 
 12. Distributed Solar, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy
/distributed-solar [https://perma.cc/EY7F-5GUC]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Duke Energy currently operates seven coal-fired power plants in North Carolina: 
Allen Steam Station (Gaston County); Asheville Plant (Skyland, NC); Belews Creek 
Steam Station (Stokes County); Cliffside Steam Station (Cleveland and Rutherford 
Counties); Marshall Steam Station (Catawba County); Mayo Plant (Roxboro, NC); and 
Roxboro Steam Plant (Semora, NC). Power Plants, DUKE ENERGY, https://www.duke-
energy.com/our-company/about-us/power-plants [https://perma.cc/5N2B-SHLL]. 
 15. History and Response Timeline, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov
/dukeenergy-coalash/history-and-response-timeline [https://perma.cc/VYT9-XG5Q]. 
 16. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	62-3(23)(a)(1) (2015). 
 17. Immediately prior to the time of publication of this Article, the North Carolina 
General Assembly enacted H.B. 589, which impacts some of the issues discussed in the 
Article. The legislation does not, however, affect the arguments in favor of power 
purchase agreements set forth in the Article. See Act of June 30, 2017, (H.B. 589) 2017 
N.C. Sess. Laws __. 
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III then reviews the decision by the North Carolina Utilities 
Commission in NC WARN to prohibit PPAs, and Part IV examines 
how that decision is consistent with some and in tension with other 
earlier Utilities Commission decisions. Part V then contrasts the NC 
WARN decision with a decision by the Iowa Supreme Court to allow 
PPAs in that state. Part VI goes on to explain why the traditional 
policy justifications for regulating public utilities do not apply to 
companies, like NC WARN, that seek to provide financing for solar 
PV systems through power purchase agreements. Finally, Part VII 
argues that the Supreme Court of North Carolina or the North 
Carolina General Assembly should act to allow PPAs in North 
Carolina. Unless such action is taken, North Carolina will continue to 
lag behind other states in developing cleaner, more equitable energy 
policies. 
I.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF SOLAR PV SYSTEMS 
Because of the significant upfront costs of solar PV systems, most 
individuals and businesses cannot afford to purchase them outright.18 
Instead, most consumers wanting to use solar energy to reduce their 
environmental footprint and lower their electricity costs must rely on 
third-party financing. The most common forms of third-party 
financing for distributed solar PV systems are solar leases and PPAs.19 
Under a solar lease, “a customer agrees to pay a fixed lease 
payment in exchange for the right to use all of the power produced by 
 
 18. DAVID FELDMAN & MARK BOLINGER, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., ON 
THE PATH TO SUNSHOT: EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN FINANCING 
SOLAR 19, 21 (2016), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/65638.pdf [https://perma.cc/QAT9-
VCDG] (“In 2014, approximately 28% of new residential PV systems were customer 
owned.	.	.	. Residential PV historically has a high upfront cost, which significantly limits 
the pool of customers with that amount of cash on hand.”). A National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL) report models a typical 5.2kW solar PV system as costing on average 
$3.09/W (or $15,900 in total) during the first quarter of 2015. See DONALD CHUNG ET AL., 
NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. PHOTOVOLTAIC PRICES AND COST 
BREAKDOWNS: Q1 2015 BENCHMARKS FOR RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, AND UTILITY-
SCALE SYSTEMS 7 (2015), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/64746.pdf [https://perma.cc
/RVL8-RF86]. The NREL further reports that the “median reported U.S. residential 
system had a capacity of 6.1kW in 2014 and cost approximately $26,000—which is 40% less 
than the $44,000 a similarly sized system would have cost in 2010.” FELDMAN & 
BOLINGER, supra, at 18. The PV system installed on the roof of Faith Community Church 
was 5.2 kW. See N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. 
SP-100, SUB 31, at 1 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n June 17, 2017) (Request for Declaratory 
Ruling). 
 19. FELDMAN & BOLINGER, supra note 18, at 23. According to NREL, third-party 
ownership systems, including solar leases and power purchase agreements, accounted for 
“approximately 72% of the residential PV market installed in 2014.” Id. 
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[a] PV system” located on the customer’s property.20 The third-party 
financier (the “solar financier”), or an agent working on its behalf, 
installs the solar PV system on the customer’s property.21 Although 
the solar PV system may be located on the customer’s rooftop, the 
solar financier retains legal ownership of the PV system.22 Under the 
terms of a typical solar lease, the customer pays the solar financier a 
set monthly fee for the use of the solar PV system, regardless of the 
amount of electricity that the system actually produces.23 The solar 
financier commonly agrees under the solar lease to provide 
maintenance and upkeep of the system in the event of any problems 
during the term of the lease.24 
In contrast, with a power purchase agreement, “the customer 
agrees to buy the power generated by the system at a set price per 
kilowatt-hour.”25 Under this approach, the solar financier or its agent 
installs the solar PV system on the customer’s property and, as with a 
solar lease, the solar financier retains ownership of the system.26 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N., MODEL POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR 
RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS (AGGREGATED) 2, http://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/resources
/SAPC%20Residential_PPA%20Agreement%20_CA_%20Aggregated_Clean_5-20-16.doc 
[https://perma.cc/7BBE-SMFN] (“The System will be installed by [Provider] at the address 
[the customer] listed above.”). 
 22. Id. at 5. 
 23. Note, however, that the form solar lease for residential customers created by the 
Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) provides for inclusion of a performance 
guaranty that allows for a refund on lease payments in the event that the solar PV system 
generates less electricity than guaranteed by the lessor. See id. at 14 (“[Provider] 
guarantees that during the Power Purchase Agreement Term the System will operate 
within manufacturer’s specifications and if it does not that [Provider] will repair or replace 
any defective part and restore System performance.”). 
 24. See id. at 3 (requiring the lessor to “repair the System pursuant to the Limited 
Warranty and reasonably cooperate with [the lessee] when scheduling repairs”). 
 25. FELDMAN & BOLINGER, supra note 18, at 23. For a form power purchase 
agreement developed by the Interstate Renewable Energy Council, see INTERSTATE 
RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, SOLAR ENERGY POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND 
SALE, http://www.irecusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Final_Clean_PPA_Template.docx 
[https://perma.cc/HPC2-AR3R]. 
 26. See Solar Power Purchase Agreements: a Toolkit for Local Governments, 
INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, 1-1, 3-1 (Mar. 2015), http://www.irecusa.org
/publications/solar-power-purchase-agreements-a-toolkit-for-local-governments/ 
[https://perma.cc/2ER3-FWGK]. (“A retail solar PPA is a long-term contract to purchase 
power from a third-party owner and operator of a solar energy generation system. This 
contrasts with a ‘direct-ownership’ arrangement, where the local government itself owns a 
solar project.”). 
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Rather than paying a set monthly fee for the electricity produced by 
the system, the PPA customer pays only for the use of the system.27 
Therefore, under both a solar lease and a PPA, the solar PV 
system located on the customer’s property is owned by the solar 
financier. The major difference between the solar lease and the PPA 
is that with a lease the customer pays a flat monthly amount for the 
use of the solar PV system, while under a PPA the customer pays a 
specified amount for each kilowatt hour (“kWh”) of electricity 
generated by the solar PV system.28 To illustrate, the terms of the 
solar lease may call for the customer to pay $50 per month for the use 
of a solar PV system, regardless of the amount of electricity produced 
by the system; the PPA, on the other hand, might call for the 
customer to pay $0.05 per kWh of electricity produced by the system, 
with the customer paying only for the electricity actually generated. 
From the customer’s perspective, PPAs are often considered more 
attractive than solar leases because of the reduced risk of 
overpayment. Since a customer only pays for the electricity actually 
produced under a PPA, the customer does not run the risk of 
“overpaying” if the solar PV system produces less electricity than 
anticipated.29 
The method for financing solar PV systems is only one aspect of 
the economics of distributed solar. Tax incentives and net metering 
are two other important components. As mentioned above, the solar 
financier retains ownership of the PV system under both a solar lease 
and a PPA. By retaining ownership, the financier is able to take 
advantage of substantial tax benefits or pass those benefits on to tax 
equity investors.30 The tax benefits enable the solar financier, in many 
 
 27. Types of Solar Leases and PPAs, ENERGYSAGE, https://www.energysage.com
/solar/financing/types-of-solar-leases-and-ppas [https://perma.cc/V79R-CBH2] (describing 
the differences between solar leases and power purchase agreements). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See MARK BOLINGER, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., 
FINANCING NON-RESIDENTIAL PHOTOVOLTAIC PROJECTS: OPTIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 18 (2009), https://stuff.mit.edu/afs/athena/dept/cron/Backup/project/urban-
sustainability/Old%20files%20from%20summer%202009/Bjorn/solar/financing%20non-
res%20pv%20projects%20Berkley%20Lab%202009.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HCW-GL6D] 
(“The primary difference [between solar leases and PPAs]—which reportedly is a major 
selling point for the PPA—is that, under a PPA, the site host is not required to operate 
and maintain the system, and likewise faces no performance risk. In short, the PPA model 
effectively provides the site host what it presumably really wants—solar power at an 
affordable price, rather than solar equipment that it must operate and maintain.”) 
(footnote and citation omitted). 
 30. A tax-exempt customer, such as Faith Community Church, would not be able to 
take advantage of these tax benefits if it owned the solar PV system, since the tax-exempt 
customer is not subject to tax and therefore has no use for the tax benefits. The third party 
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instances, to charge a lower rate to the customer for the energy 
generated by the solar PV system than the public utility charges.31 On 
the federal level, the tax benefits include a thirty percent Investment 
Tax Credit,32 as well as a five-year accelerated depreciation 
schedule.33 Depending on the state where the customer is located, 
state tax benefits may also apply. North Carolina, for example, 
provided for a thirty-five percent income tax credit for solar PV 
systems installed before December 31, 2015, when the General 
Assembly allowed this tax credit to expire.34 
Another factor in the economics of distributed solar is so-called 
“net metering.” As defined by the Solar Energy Industries 
Association, net metering “allows residential and commercial 
 
owner in a power purchase agreement, on the other hand, is typically a taxable entity or 
serves as a conduit to taxable investors and therefore is able to take advantage of the tax 
benefits. The facts of the NC WARN decision are somewhat unusual in that a tax-exempt 
entity (NC WARN) served as third-party owner under the power purchase agreement. NC 
WARN entered into the PPA with Faith Community Church, despite being unable to take 
advantage of the tax benefits, as a “test case” in hopes of opening the market for financing 
solar PV systems in North Carolina in furtherance of its mission to combat climate change. 
In large-scale solar projects, tax equity investors are used, since relatively few individuals 
or third-party financiers could take advantage of the significant amount of tax savings 
available. See Keith Martin, Solar Tax Equity Structures, CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP 
(Sept. 2015), http://www.chadbourne.com/Solar_Tax_Equity_Structures_projectfinance 
[https://perma.cc/ECB5-M2VJ] (providing a description of tax equity structures commonly 
used in financing solar projects); see also LINDER & DI CAPUA, supra note 4, at 5–10 
(describing the various business models for “solar deployment”). 
 31. In the event that the solar PV site host is a tax exempt entity, the arrangement 
with the solar financier may need to be structured as a PPA, rather than a solar lease, in 
order for the solar financier to be able to take advantage of the tax benefits. See I.R.C. 
§	168(h)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (setting out rules regarding “disqualified leases”); see also 
BOLINGER, supra note 29, at 24 (“Since tax-exempt entities cannot enter into a ‘normal’ 
lease transaction (i.e., a taxable operating or capital lease .	.	. ) without jeopardizing the 
use (by either the lessor or the lessee) of the project’s Tax Benefits, it is vital that a solar 
PPA with a tax-exempt site host be properly structured as a service contract, so that it 
cannot be misconstrued as a lease.”). 
 32. I.R.C. §	25D (2012) (residential); id. §	48 (2012) (commercial and utility); see also, 
Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC), SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org
/policy/finance-tax/solar-investment-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/X9T5-AZN2]. 
 33. I.R.C. §	168(e)(3)(B)(I) (2012); see also Depreciation of Solar Energy Property in 
MACRS, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N., http://www.seia.org/policy/finance-tax
/depreciation-solar-energy-property-macrs [https://perma.cc/JE38-HVKB] (explaining the 
Modified Acceleration Cost Recovery System); Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC), supra 
note 32. 
 34. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	105-129.16A(a) (2015); Renewable Energy Tax Credit 
(Personal), DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY & 
EFFICIENCY, NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., http://programs.dsireusa.org/system
/program/detail/541 [https://perma.cc/L6ES-2Z8K] (last updated Feb. 2, 2017) (“This 
credit expired at the end of 2015. Systems installed in 2016 or later years will not qualify 
for this credit.”). 
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customers who generate their own electricity from solar power to 
feed electricity they do not use back into the grid.”35 When a solar PV 
system produces more electricity than the customer is using at any 
particular time, the excess electricity is fed back into the grid and the 
customer is credited for that excess electricity. As a result, customers 
with solar PV systems are billed by the public utility only for the 
“net” electricity they use—electricity consumed from the grid less 
electricity fed into the grid. Some states, like North Carolina, offer a 
one-to-one credit for solar-generated electricity fed into the grid by 
customers.36 This means that if a solar PV system located on a 
customer’s property generates one kWh of electricity more than the 
customer uses, and that kWh is fed into the grid, the customer is 
credited for one kWh that the customer later consumes from the grid. 
Other states have less generous net metering policies, crediting 
customers at less than a one-to-one rate for electricity that the 
customer feeds into the grid.37 The amount of credit received by a 
customer for electricity produced by a solar PV system located on the 
customer’s property and fed into the electric grid factors heavily into 
the financial analysis of whether opting for distributed solar makes 
sense.38 
 
 35. See Net Metering, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy
/distributed-solar/net-metering [https://perma.cc/D3WP-WHLL]. The North Carolina 
Utilities Commission has defined net metering as “the billing arrangement whereby the 
customer-generator is billed according to the difference over a billing period between the 
amount of energy consumed by the customer at its premises and the amount of energy 
generated by the renewable energy facility.” Investigation of Proposed Net Metering 
Rule, Docket No. E-100, SUB 83, at 3, 245 Pub. Utils. Rep. 4th (PUR) 134, 137 (N.C Utils. 
Comm’n Oct. 20, 2005), 2005 WL 2709031. 
 36. North Carolina’s current net metering policy is set forth in a 2009 Order by the 
Utilities Commission. See Investigation of Net Metering, Docket No. E-100, SUB 83, at 1, 
272 Pub. Utils. Rep. 4th (PUR) 323, 323–24 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Mar. 31, 2009). But see 
Act of June 30, 2017, (H.B. 589), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws __ (directing the Utilities 
Commission to establish new net metering rates). 
 37. Nevada, for example, credits customers at the “avoided cost” rate rather than at 
the full retail rate for electricity fed into the grid. See Net Metering, DATABASE OF STATE 
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY & EFFICIENCY, NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH. 
CTR., http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/372 (last updated Oct. 28, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/3E44-T8ZM]. The “avoided cost” rate is the price that the public utility 
would have to pay to generate electricity itself or the amount it would pay to acquire 
electricity on the open market, essentially the wholesale cost of electricity rather than the 
retail rate paid by public utilities in North Carolina. See id. (“All exported generation is 
credited at the avoided cost rate. Any credits that exceed the customer’s monthly bill will 
be carried over to the next billing period. Remaining credits at the end of the year will be 
paid to the customer.”). 
 38. Under the terms of a typical power purchase agreement, the host customer is 
billed for all electricity generated by the on-site solar PV system, but is allowed the benefit 
of the net metering credit for any excess electricity fed into the grid. See INTERSTATE 
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Thus, the primary economic factors in deciding whether to 
participate in the distributed solar market include the direct cost of 
the solar PV system and the financing options available for bearing 
that cost, the tax benefits associated with the installation and use of 
the PV system, and the amount of credit allowed for excess electricity 
generated by the solar PV system and fed into the grid. North 
Carolina has hampered the spread of distributed solar by disallowing 
PPAs, one of the main methods for financing PV systems, and by 
failing to retain state-level tax incentives for solar electricity 
production. The state does maintain one of the more generous net 
metering policies,39 but, given the decision in NC WARN, the benefit 
of net metering is available only to consumers who can afford the 
high upfront cost of purchasing a solar PV. Thus, the State’s 
restrictive financing policy and favorable net metering policy combine 
to exacerbate economic inequality, as only the wealthy can afford to 
participate in the solar PV market and thereby receive the benefit of 
the State’s net metering policy.40 Ironically, as discussed below, the 
rationale behind the Utilities Commission’s decision in NC WARN 
was to protect the economic interests of consumers who do not 
 
RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 7–13 (“Any output not immediately 
usable by Host Customer will be exported to the Host Utility pursuant to Interconnection 
and Net Metering Agreements.”); see also SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 35 
(“Net metering is a billing mechanism that credits solar energy system owners for 
electricity they add to the grid.”). 
 39. Arguably, a one-for-one credit for electricity fed into the grid overcompensates 
the customer, since the customer is effectively getting the equivalent of battery storage of 
the electricity that the solar PV system produces without having to pay for that storage. 
See FELDMAN & BOLINGER, supra note 18, at 18–19 (stating that most residential systems 
feedback into the grid and are credited at retail rates). See also Act of June 30, 2017, (H.B. 
589), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws __ (directing the Utilities Commission to establish new net 
metering rates). 
 40. The North Carolina Utilities Commission has defined net metering as “the billing 
arrangement whereby the customer-generator is billed according to the difference over a 
billing period between the amount of energy consumed by the customer at its premises 
and the amount of energy generated by the renewable energy facility.” See Investigation of 
Proposed Net Metering Rule, Docket No. E-100, SUB 83, at 3, 245 Pub. Utils. Rep. 4th 
(PUR) 134, 137 (emphasis added). It is not clear from this definition whether a solar 
financier would be permitted to take advantage of the State’s net metering policy, since 
the solar financier is arguably not a “customer-generator.” If the solar generator is allowed 
to participate in net metering, that benefit could be passed through to the host consumer. 
See id. If not, allowing host consumers to enter into PPAs and receive the resulting benefit 
of reduced costs for electricity would still mitigate the inequality that currently exists in 
which only the wealthy benefit from both subsidized solar electricity (subsidized through 
the tax benefits available) and from the State’s net metering policy. See Ashley Brown & 
Jillian Bunyan, Valuation of Distributed Solar: A Qualitative View, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 27, 
27 (2014) (noting that retail net metering “effectively transfers wealth from less affluent to 
more affluent consumers”). 
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participate in the solar PV market. The effect of the NC WARN 
decision, however, is to allow only those who can afford to self-
finance solar PV systems to reap the benefits of the State’s favorable 
net metering policy.41 
II.  STATUTORY AND CASE LAW BACKGROUND 
In order to understand the Utilities Commission’s decision to 
prohibit power purchase agreements in NC WARN, it is first helpful 
to understand the statutory and case law background that informed 
the decision. 
 
A. Statutory Background: Definition of a “Public Utility” 
By statute, North Carolina allows for the sale of electricity by 
only one “public utility” in a specified geographic area.42 The North 
Carolina General Statutes define a “public utility” as follows: 
[A] person, whether organized under the laws of this State or 
under the laws of any other state or country, now or hereafter 
owning or operating in this State equipment or facilities for .	.	. 
producing, generating, transmitting, delivering or furnishing 
electricity, piped gas, steam or any other like agency for the 
production of light, heat or power to or for the public for 
compensation; provided, however, that the term “public utility” 
shall not include persons who construct or operate an electric 
generating facility, the primary purpose of which facility is for 
 
 41. See Brown & Bunyan, supra note 40, at 44 (arguing that retail net metering 
provides a subsidy from non-solar customers to distributed solar generators). But see Mark 
Muro & Devashree Saha, Rooftop Solar: Net Metering is a Net Benefit, BROOKINGS (May 
23, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/rooftop-solar-net-metering-is-a-net-benefit/ 
[https://perma.cc/CV5Q-8SSA] (listing numerous studies contending that “net metering 
benefits all utility customers”). See also Act of June 30, 2017, (H.B. 589), 2017 N.C. Sess. 
Laws __ (directing the Utilities Commission to establish new net metering rates). 
 42. This was incorporated into statute by the Territorial Assignment Act of 1965. See 
ch. 287, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 328, 328–41 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	62-110.2, 160A-
331 to -38). See also Morgan v. Hertford, 70 N.C. App. 725, 727, 321 S.E.2d 170, 172 (1984) 
(“The Territorial Assignment Act of 1965 .	.	. represents an attempt to eliminate the 
‘uneconomic duplication of transmission and distribution systems’ bred of unbridled 
competition between public utilities, electric membership corporations and municipalities 
by designating the various competitors’ rights.”) (quoting Domestic Elec. Serv., Inc. v. 
Rocky Mount, 285 N.C. 135, 203 S.E.2d 838 (1974))). As explained by the North Carolina 
Utilities Commission, under the “traditional regulatory bargain,” public utilities exchange 
the “benefit of monopoly franchised service territory for [the] obligation to provide 
adequate service at reasonable rates.” N.C. UTILS. COMM’N, NORTH CAROLINA’S PUBLIC 
UTILITY INFRASTRUCTURE AND REGULATORY CLIMATE 4 (July 2016), http://www.ncuc
.commerce.state.nc.us/overview/Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5LX-NKDV]. 
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such person’s own use and not for the primary purpose of 
producing electricity, heat, or steam for sale to or for the public 
for compensation.43 
Unquestionably, the solar financier under a power purchase 
agreement owns equipment, the solar PV system, for delivering 
electricity to the host consumer. That is the very essence of the 
PPA—the financier retains ownership of the PV system (primarily to 
obtain the accompanying tax benefits associated with that ownership) 
and sells the electricity produced by the system to the consumer. At 
its core then, the determination of whether the solar financier is a 
“public utility” as defined by statute depends on whether this 
arrangement is deemed to amount to furnishing electricity “to or for 
the public.”44 If it is, the arrangement established by the power 
purchase agreement violates the incumbent public utility’s exclusive 
franchise to sell electricity to the public in the particular geographic 
area. 
It is important to note that the second part of the definition of 
“public utility” contains the exception for those who can afford to 
purchase solar PV systems outright, rather than needing to enter into 
a financing arrangement like a power purchase agreement. The 
statute states that the term “public utility” does not include “persons 
who construct or operate an electric generating facility, the primary 
purpose of which facility is for such person’s own use and not for the 
primary purpose of producing electricity .	.	. for sale to or for the 
public for compensation.”45 Thus, if a consumer can afford to 
purchase a solar PV system outright, the statute specifically excludes 
that consumer from the definition of public utility. Only consumers 
who cannot afford the high upfront cost of solar PV systems need to 
worry about whether the arrangements they enter into to finance the 
systems come within the jurisdiction of the Utilities Commission. 
B. Case Law Precedent: State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. 
Simpson46 
According to the North Carolina Utilities Commission, “the 
most significant case addressing the issue of ‘sales to or for the public’ 
 
 43. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	62-3(23)(a)(1) (2015) (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. 295 N.C. 519, 246 S.E.2d 753 (1978). 
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is State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson.”47 In Simpson, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina considered whether two-way radio services 
offered by a physician, Dr. William Simpson, to fifty-five to sixty 
other members of the Cleveland County Medical Society constituted 
an offer of the service “to or for the public[,]” and therefore rendered 
Dr. Simpson a public utility subject to regulation by the Utilities 
Commission.48 
The Simpson court explained that the provision of a service “to 
or for the public” does not necessarily mean that the service must be 
offered to “everybody all the time.”49 In other words, the fact that Dr. 
Simpson offered two-way radio service only to members of his 
medical society, and not to the public at large, did not preclude a 
finding that the service was offered “to the public” within the 
meaning of the statute. The Simpson court quoted from an earlier 
Supreme Court of North Carolina case, Utilities Commission v. 
Carolina Telephone and Telegraph Co,50. in support of this 
proposition, stating 
One offers service to the “public” within the meaning of [the 
public utility] statute when he holds himself out as willing to 
serve all who apply up to the capacity of his facilities. It is 
immaterial, in this connection, that his service is limited to a 
specified area and his facilities are limited in capacity. For 
example, the operator of a single vehicle within a single 
community may be a common carrier.51 
According to the Simpson court, this language from Carolina 
Telephone did not foreclose the possibility that a service offered only 
to a “selected class of persons might also be considered an offering to 
the ‘public.’	”52 To resolve this issue of whether a service offered only 
to a subgroup of persons (Cleveland County doctors in the Simpson 
case) constitutes an offer “to or for the public[,]” the Simpson court 
first reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions. The court 
summarized the “teaching[s]” from these cases as follows: 
 
 47. N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP-100, 
SUB 31, at 18 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1572367, at *18 (Order 
Issuing Declaratory Ruling). 
 48. State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 520, 246 S.E.2d 753, 754 
(1978). 
 49. Id. at 522, 246 S.E.2d at 755 (quoting Terminal Taxicab Co. v. District of 
Columbia, 241 U.S. 252, 255 (1916)). 
 50. 267 N.C. 257, 148 S.E.2d 100 (1966). 
 51. Simpson, 295 N.C. at 522, 246 S.E.2d at 755 (quoting Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 267 
N.C. at 268, 148 S.E.2d at 109). 
 52. Id. at 523, 246 S.E.2d at 756. 
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[W]hether any given enterprise is a public utility within the 
meaning of a regulatory scheme does not depend on some 
abstract, formulistic definition of “public” to be thereafter 
universally applied. What is the “public” in any given case 
depends rather on the regulatory circumstances of that case. 
Some of these circumstances are (1) nature of the industry 
sought to be regulated; (2) type of market served by the 
industry; (3) the kind of competition that naturally inheres in 
that market; and (4) effect of non-regulation or exemption from 
regulation of one or more persons engaged in the industry. The 
meaning of “public” must in the final analysis be such as will, in 
the context of the regulatory circumstances .	.	. accomplish the 
legislature’s purpose and comport with its public policy.53 
The Simpson court went on to endorse the position previously 
taken by the supreme courts of Iowa and New Mexico that “sales to 
sufficient of the public to clothe the operation with a public interest” 
amount to an offering “to or for the public” and therefore come 
within the definition of a public utility.54 According to the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina in Simpson, “[i]t is this type of flexible 
interpretation that is necessary to comport legislative purpose with 
the variable nature of modern technology.”55 
In light of this standard, the Simpson court examined the 
characteristics of the radio common carrier market in Cleveland 
County, where Dr. Simpson was offering the two-way radio service. 
The court stated that the market was “a small one whose users fall 
into definable classes,” such as doctors, real estate agents, and 
builders.56 Dr. Simpson had offered his two-way radio service to the 
fifty-five to sixty members of the Cleveland County Medical Society, 
and he was actually providing the service to ten of those members.57 
The court stated that there were “only 22 radio common carrier 
subscribers in the whole of Cleveland County” and, as a result, Dr. 
Simpson was providing service for “over 45% of the available 
market.”58 
Based on these facts about the two-way radio service market in 
Cleveland County, the court concluded that if a definition of “public” 
were adopted that “allowed prospective offerors of services to 
 
 53. Id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756–57 (quoting State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 
32 N.C. App. 543, 546, 232 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1977)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 757. 
 56. Id. at 525, 246 S.E.2d at 757. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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approach .	.	. separate classes [such as doctors, real estate agents, and 
builders] without falling under the statute, the industry could easily 
shift from a regulated to a largely unregulated one.”59 According to 
the court, “the end result .	.	. could well be that the only subscribers 
left in the regulated market would be those who fit in no easily 
definable class.”60 The court predicted that “unregulated radio 
services might focus on classes which are easier and more profitable 
to serve[,]” with the result being to “leave burdensome, less profitable 
service on the regulated portion resulting inevitably in higher prices 
for the service.”61 
Thus, after laying out four “regulatory circumstances” that it 
deemed relevant in determining what constitutes “the ‘public’	” for 
public utility purposes, the Simpson court focused on just two of those 
circumstances: (1) the type of market served by the industry; and (2) 
the effect of non-regulation.62 With respect to the type of market 
served by the radio common carrier industry, the court characterized 
the market as small and comprised primarily of users who could be 
designated into separate, definable categories such as doctors, real 
estate agents, and builders.63 As to the effect of non-regulation, the 
court found that unregulated providers of two-way radio services 
served a significant portion of the overall market (over forty-five 
percent by Dr. Simpson alone), potentially resulting in increased costs 
for those who did not fall into the definable categories that 
unregulated competitors were likely to target and serve.64 The court 
did not expressly discuss the other two “regulatory circumstances” 
(nature of the industry and kind of competition that naturally inheres 
in the market) that it had declared to be relevant in determining 
whether regulation by the Utilities Commission would “accomplish 
‘the legislature’s purpose and comport with its public policy.’	”65 In 
summary, the Simpson court concluded that if Dr. Simpson (and 
anyone else who, like him, offered two-way radio service in Cleveland 
County) were not considered a public utility and therefore not 
regulated by the Utilities Commission, the two-way radio market 
would effectively become an unregulated market, resulting in higher 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 757. 
 63. Id. at 525, 246 S.E.2d at 757. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 
32 N.C. App. 543, 546, 232 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1977)). 
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prices for the few remaining consumers who were not able to receive 
service from an unregulated service provider.66 
The decision in Simpson allows for substantial subjectivity in 
determining whether a service is offered to “the public” and therefore 
comes within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Utilities Commission. 
The “regulatory circumstances” introduced by the court as relevant to 
the determination are both nonexhaustive67 and, based on the 
absence of any discussion of two of those circumstances in the 
Simpson case itself, apparently nonessential. Thus, Simpson provides 
only loose guidance for a tribunal (a court or the Utilities 
Commission) in determining whether a service is offered “to or for 
the public” and therefore subject to regulation by the Utilities 
Commission.68 As explained by the Simpson court, the regulatory 
circumstances enumerated in the opinion are ultimately intended to 
assist the decision maker in assessing whether regulation of the 
proffered service will “accomplish the legislature’s purpose and 
comport with its public policy.”69 
Given the flexibility provided in the Simpson case, identifying 
those services that the General Assembly would intend to be 
regulated by the Utilities Commission has proven somewhat 
unpredictable. This is the case, at least in part, because the General 
Assembly has made numerous public policy pronouncements relating 
to energy production. Specifically, the General Assembly has stated 
that it is the “declared policy” of the State to work towards the 
following goals: 
1. “To promote the inherent advantage of regulated public 
utilities”70 
2. “To promote adequate, reliable, and economical utility service 
to all of the citizens and residents of the state”71 
3. “To assure that resources necessary to meet future growth 
through the provision of adequate, reliable utility service include use 
of the entire spectrum of demand-side options, including but not 
limited to conservation, load management and efficiency programs, as 
 
 66. Id. at 525, 246 S.E.2d at 757. 
 67. The court characterized the four factors it set forth as “some” of the regulatory 
circumstances relevant to determining whether a service was offered “to the public.” Id. at 
524, 246 S.E.2d at 756. 
 68. Id. at 525, 246 S.E.2d at 757. 
 69. Id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting Simpson, 32 N.C. App. 543, 546, 232 S.E.2d 
871, 873 (1977)). 
 70. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	62-2(a)(2) (2015). 
 71. Id. §	62-2(a)(3). 
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additional sources of energy supply and/or energy demand 
reductions”72 
4. “To encourage and promote harmony between public utilities, 
their users and the environment”73 
In addition, the General Assembly has declared it is the policy of 
the State to “promote the development of renewable energy and 
energy efficiency through the implementation of a Renewable Energy 
and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (REPS).”74 Under the 
REPS requirement, all electric public utilities, including investor-
owned utilities such as Duke Energy, are required by 2021 to meet at 
least 12.5% of the State’s energy needs through renewable energy 
resources and energy efficiency measures.75 As explained by the 
General Assembly, the REPS requirement is intended to do all of the 
following: 
1. “Diversify the resources used to reliably meet the energy needs 
of consumers in the State”  
2. “Provide greater energy security through the use of indigenous 
energy resources available within the State”  
3. “Encourage private investment in renewable energy and 
energy efficiency”  
4. “Provide improved air quality and other benefits to energy 
consumers and citizens of the State”76 
The potentially conflicting policies of “promot[ing] the inherent 
advantage of regulated public utilities”77 while also “promot[ing] the 
development of renewable energy and energy efficiency”78 has led to 
a series of pre-NC WARN decisions by the Utilities Commission that 
prove difficult to reconcile. Part III briefly discusses those decisions 
before turning to an analysis of the NC WARN decision itself. 
III.  PRE-NC WARN UTILITIES COMMISSION DECISIONS 
CONSTRUING “TO OR FOR THE PUBLIC” 
Before the Utilities Commission’s decision in NC WARN, the 
Commission construed the meaning of the term “to or for the 
public[,]” as that term is used in the statutory definition of a public 
utility, in six key decisions. Those decisions are described below. 
 
 72. Id. §	62-2(a)(3a). 
 73. Id. §	62-2(a)(5). 
 74. Id. §	62-2(a)(10). 
 75. Id. §	62-133.8(b). 
 76. Id. §	62-2(a)(10). 
 77. Id. §	62-2(a)(2). 
 78. Id. §	62-2(a)(10). 
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A. Natural Power, Inc. (1988) 
In Natural Power, Inc., Raleigh Landfill Gas Corp., (“Natural 
Power”),79 the Utilities Commission decided that the sale of both gas 
and steam via individually negotiated contracts did not render the 
sellers public utilities.80 Under the facts of the case, a landfill owner 
(Raleigh Landfill Gas Corporation) entered into an agreement to sell 
landfill gas to a single customer (Natural Power, Inc.).81 Natural 
Power, Inc., in turn planned to use the gas to generate steam, which it 
contracted to sell to a pharmaceutical plant owned by Ajinomoto, 
USA, Inc.82 Ajinomoto intended to use the steam for pharmaceutical 
processing and related business purposes.83 
In concluding that neither Raleigh Landfill nor Natural Power 
should be regulated as public utilities, the Commission relied on four 
main factors. First, the end product of the various activities involved 
was steam, which “has not been regulated to the same degree” as 
electricity.84 Second, the contracts involved were “bargained for” 
transactions between individual corporations rather than offers to the 
public at large.85 Third, the steam provided by Natural Power to 
Ajinomoto would be used in Ajinomoto’s industrial processes rather 
than to generate electricity, and the steam would not be resold to 
other parties.86 And fourth, the steam provided by Natural Power 
would not meet all of Ajinomoto’s needs, and Ajinomoto would 
remain dependent on the incumbent public utility for the balance of 
its steam needs.87 This meant that “not all public utility revenues from 
Ajinomoto [would] be diverted.”88 Based on these factors, the 
Utilities Commission held that the arrangement did not call for 
regulation of any of the parties as a public utility.89 
 
 79. Docket No. SP-100, SUB 1, 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 340 (N.C. Utils. 
Comm’n Dec. 22, 1988), 1988 WL 391223. 
 80. Id. at 343. 
 81. Id. at 341. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 342. 
 85. Id. at 342–43. 
 86. Id. at 343. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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B. National Spinning Co. (1996) 
The proposed arrangement in National Spinning Co.,90 involved 
two parties working together to produce electricity. As proposed, a 
gasifier owned by National Spinning Company, Inc. (“National 
Spinning”) would gasify wood waste.91 The resulting gas would be 
sold by National Spinning to Wayne S. Leary (“Leary”).92 Leary 
would run the gas through a steamer, which he owned.93 Leary would 
then sell the resulting steam to National Spinning, which would, in 
turn, pass the steam through a steam turbine and other electric 
generating facilities owned by National Spinning to produce 
electricity.94 National Spinning planned to use the electricity for its 
own industrial purposes.95 The company did not expect the 
arrangement with Leary to meet all of its electricity needs, however, 
so National Spinning would remain connected to the grid and 
continue to purchase electricity from the incumbent public utility, 
Carolina Power & Light (“CP & L”).96 
Under these facts, the Commission denied the petition by 
National Spinning and Leary for a declaratory ruling that “no 
regulated utility would result from the proposed activities.”97 The 
Commission based its decision in large part on the negative 
consequences it believed would result from the arrangement, and 
similar ones that might follow, to both electric utilities and the public 
at large. With respect to the incumbent electric utility, the 
Commission stated that “unregulated electric suppliers could ‘cherry 
pick’ the electric utilities’ best customers, leaving them with 
significant stranded investment.”98 It explained that regulated electric 
utilities plan and build generation plants based on the needs of large 
industrial customers, like National Spinning, which spent more than 
$3 million annually in electricity costs.99 If unregulated electricity 
suppliers were allowed to lure away this type of highly desirable 
customer, the public utility might not make the expected return on its 
investment in generating facilities intended to serve such customers. 
Ultimately, this would harm other consumers, as the lost revenues 
 
 90. Docket No. SP-100, SUB 7 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 22, 1996), 1996 WL 252627. 
 91. Id. at 3. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 7. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2017) 
2017] SOLAR FINANCING IN N.C. 1619 
suffered by the public utility would have to be made up through 
higher rates charged “to the remaining residential, commercial and 
smaller industrial customers, who are not in a position to install 
turbine generators and purchase generation steam.”100 
The reasoning in National Spinning, with the Utilities 
Commission focusing on potential cost increases to consumers not 
able to receive service from an unregulated provider, is very similar to 
the basis for the decision by the court in Simpson. And as with 
Simpson, where the unregulated provider served forty-five percent of 
the market for two-way radio service in Cleveland County,101 the scale 
of the potential loss to the incumbent electric utility in National 
Spinning may have influenced the decision in the case. In deciding to 
prohibit the proposed arrangement, the Utilities Commission took 
into account the prospect of losing such a significant customer as 
National Spinning, which purchased $3 million in electricity from 
CP&L annually, and the accompanying loss of investment by the 
utility in the infrastructure necessary to serve the consumer.102 
C. Progress Solar Investments, LLC (2009) 
In Progress Solar Investments, LLC,103 the Utilities Commission 
held that the sale of solar powered lighting did not render the seller a 
public utility.104 Progress Solar Investments, LLC (“PSI”) proposed to 
“install and maintain solar LED lighting systems to provide light in 
user-designated areas.”105 The lighting systems were completely self-
contained, meaning that PSI did not need electricity from the grid to 
power the lighting systems, but instead planned to generate its own 
electricity through an on-site solar PV system.106 
The argument for treating PSI as a public utility was based 
primarily on the statutory definition, which, as previously discussed, 
provides that a public utility is “a person .	.	. now or hereafter owning 
or operating in this State equipment or facilities for .	.	. [p]roducing, 
generating, transmitting, delivering or furnishing electricity, piped 
gas, steam or any other like agency for the production of light, heat or 
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power to or for the public for compensation.”107 Despite the fact that 
PSI planned to own and operate solar electricity-generating 
equipment on the customer’s property “for the production of light[,]” 
the Commission determined PSI was not a public utility.108 The 
Commission explained this result as follows: 
The use of solar resources to provide lighting as proposed by 
PSI is consistent with the recently enacted policy of the State to 
promote the development of renewable resources. PSI will not 
be holding itself out to provide solar lighting to the general 
public, and the lighting will be provided only as a result of 
bargained for transactions and pursuant to agreed-upon terms 
and conditions. Unlike steam and piped gas, the light produced 
by the solar lighting systems cannot be used to generate 
electricity and thus be used indirectly to bypass the electric 
utilities’ exclusive franchises.109 
The Utilities Commission’s reasoning regarding the potential 
impact (or lack thereof) on the electric utilities’ exclusive franchises 
seems questionable. It is true that the end consumer could not use the 
light produced by PSI to generate electricity.110 Even so, the light 
purchased by the consumer existed only due to the electricity 
generated by PSI’s on-site solar PV system, rather than because of 
electricity generated and sold by the incumbent electric utility.111 
Consequently, despite the Utilities Commission’s statement 
otherwise, the arrangement under review indirectly bypassed the 
public utility’s exclusive franchise on the sale of electricity. 
D. FLS YK Farm, LLC (2009) 
In FLS YK Farm, LLC,112 the Commission considered whether 
the provision of hot water by one party to another through the use of 
solar thermal panels rendered the first party a public utility. The 
Commission concluded that 
the sale of BTUs [British Thermal Units] by the owner or 
operator of solar thermal panels located on-site to a single 
entity pursuant to a “bargained for” transaction for the purpose 
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of heating water for the entity’s on-site use does not constitute 
the provision of utility service to or for the public and, 
therefore, such an owner or operator would not fall within the 
[statutory] definition of a public utility.113 
The reasons cited by the Commission for reaching this result 
included: the existence of a bargained-for agreement between a single 
provider and a single customer; the fact that the heated water would 
be used on-site; and the public policy considerations that had recently 
been articulated by the General Assembly.114 Those public policy 
considerations, taken directly from the REPS requirement enacted by 
the General Assembly in 2007, were “to promote the development of 
renewable energy for the purposes of diversifying the State’s energy 
resources, providing greater energy security through the use of 
indigenous resources, encouraging private investment in renewable 
energy, and improving air quality.”115 The fact that the Utilities 
Commission cited the policy goals set forth in the REPS requirement 
in the context of an agreement between two private parties indicates 
that those goals apply not just to the investor-owned utilities that are 
expressly subject to the requirement, but also to consumers of 
electricity in the State. 
The Commission explicitly noted in the FLS YK Farm decision 
that the solar-thermal energy facility would not generate any 
electricity, and that the “output of the solar panels [would] be used 
solely to heat water belonging to [the customer], which [would] then 
use the hot water for its on-site domestic needs.”116 This decision, 
along with Progress Solar, came shortly after the General Assembly 
enacted a statutory policy statement supporting the increased use of 
renewable energy in the State.117 Therefore, FLS YK Farm and 
Progress Solar seemed to signal a more permissive approach than the 
Utilities Commission had taken in National Spinning, which focused 
on protecting the competitive monopoly granted to electric utilities 
and preventing cost increases to other consumers rather than on 
environmental considerations.118 
 
 113. Id. at 3, 2009 WL 1106526, at *3. 
 114. Id. at 2, 2009 WL 1106526, at *2. 
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E. W.E. Partners I, LLC (2012) 
W.E. Partners I, LLC119 addressed a peculiar situation in which 
one company planned to give excess electricity generated to a second 
company.120 The electricity-generating company hoped that giving the 
electricity away for free would prevent it from coming within the 
definition of “public utility[,]” which requires that a person “deliver 
or furnish electricity .	.	. to or for the public for compensation.”121 
Despite this attempt to avoid the plain language of the statute, the 
Utilities Commission held that the electricity-producing company 
would still be considered a public utility.122 The Commission noted 
that the two parties involved had business dealings, other than the 
proposed donation of electricity from one to the other.123 The 
Commission stated that “it would be impossible for the Commission 
to identify if compensation for electricity provided ‘free of charge’ 
could exist in other financial agreements between an electric 
generator and a third party.”124 In other words, while the electricity 
might be provided for free, the parties could hide payments for the 
electricity in the pricing of other transactions between them. As 
summarized by the Commission: 
Were the Commission to rule otherwise [and allow the 
provision of “free” electricity from one party to another] it 
would open a Pandora’s box of scenarios in which an electric 
generator could provide electrical services “free of charge” to a 
third party and build in compensation to recover its costs via 
other arrangements, thus, avoiding the statutory definition of a 
public utility.125 
Thus, despite the parties’ efforts to avoid the statutory language 
regarding the provision of electricity “for compensation[,]” the 
Utilities Commission held that the electricity-generating company 
would be regulated as a public utility under the proposed 
arrangement.126 Given how peculiar such an arrangement would be, 
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this decision illustrates the Commission’s protectiveness of the 
competitive monopoly granted to electric utilities. 
F. NC GreenPower (2015) 
The Utilities Commission in NC GreenPower127 approved two 
pilot programs that sought to increase access to renewable energy 
sources for schools and non-profit organizations.128 
In its Order approving the pilot programs, the Commission 
stated that 
The Commission disagrees with [one of the commenters on the 
proposed pilot programs] that Chapter 62 [the Public Utilities 
Act] allows for power purchase agreements between utility 
customers and non-utility solar installers. Rather, the 
Commission concludes that Chapter 62 of the North Carolina 
General Statutes prohibits third-party sales of electricity by 
non-utility solar installers to retail customers.129 
The Commission did not, however, provide any discussion or 
analysis about how it reached this conclusion.130 
G. Analysis of Pre-NC WARN Decisions 
These pre-NC WARN decisions by the North Carolina Utilities 
Commission prove difficult to reconcile. First, several of the 
decisions, including Natural Power, W.E. Partners, and NC 
GreenPower, failed to mention Simpson at all and therefore did not 
expressly apply any of the “regulatory circumstances” listed in 
Simpson.131 Another decision, FLS YK Farm, mentioned Simpson and 
the “regulatory circumstances[,]” but then did not discuss any of those 
circumstances in the Commission’s analysis.132 
Some of the decisions gave attention to the issue of whether the 
arrangement subject to review was “bargained for,” or specifically 
negotiated, between the parties. In Natural Power, Progress Solar, 
and FLS YK Farm, this factor seemed influential in the Commission’s 
conclusion that the arrangement in question did not constitute an 
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offer of utility services “to or for the public.”133 The focus on the 
individualized nature of the arrangements has a logical basis, even 
though Simpson made no specific mention of this, as the more 
particularized the arrangement between parties the more it would 
appear to be a private transaction rather than an offering “to or for 
the public.”134 On the other hand, the arrangements under review in 
National Spinning and W.E. Partners were specifically bargained-for 
transactions and the Commission still found them to come within the 
jurisdiction of the Commission as offers “to or for the public.”135 
Therefore, the individualized, specially-negotiated nature of the 
transaction between parties is cited and deemed relevant by the 
Commission in some cases, but has not been determinative. 
Also discussed in two of the decisions was whether the party 
receiving the service in question would remain a customer of the 
incumbent public utility. This is at least indirectly relevant to one of 
the “regulatory circumstances” enumerated by the court in Simpson: 
the “effect of non-regulation or exemption from regulation of one or 
more persons engaged in the industry.”136 Logically, the competitive 
effect on the incumbent public utility is mitigated if the recipient of 
the service in question from an unregulated entity remains a customer 
of the regulated, public utility. In Natural Power, for example, the 
Commission specifically noted that Ajinomoto would remain 
dependent on the incumbent utility for the balance of its steam needs, 
despite the proposed arrangement with Natural Power.137 This 
circumstance factored into the Commission’s decision that Natural 
Power should not be regulated as a public utility.138 
However, remaining a customer of the incumbent public utility 
does not ensure a finding that the arrangement will avoid regulation 
by the Utilities Commission, as illustrated by Commission’s decision 
in National Spinning. In that case, the Commission specifically noted 
that National Spinning’s electricity needs would not be met 
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completely through the arrangement with Leary, and that National 
Spinning planned to remain connected to the electric grid.139 
Nevertheless, the Commission found Leary to be a public utility 
because of the potential negative competitive effects on the 
incumbent utility that could have resulted from Leary providing some 
portion of National Spinning’s electricity needs.140 It is important to 
note that National Spinning had averaged $3 million annually in 
electricity purchases from the public utility.141 As a result, even if 
National Spinning remained dependent on some level of service from 
the public utility, the potential loss of business by the public utility 
with respect to this one customer was significant. 
Perhaps the most perplexing of the pre-NC WARN decisions is 
Progress Solar. In that case, PSI proposed using a solar PV system to 
produce electricity, which would then be used to generate light that 
PSI planned to sell to the customer.142 While the arrangement in 
question was a “bargained for” transaction and the customer would 
remain connected to the electric grid since the arrangement would 
provide only for lighting needs in a parking lot owned by the 
customer, the Commission found PSI not to come within the 
definition of a public utility primarily because of the General 
Assembly’s recently-enacted public policy statements favoring 
renewable resources.143 This deference for arrangements promoting 
renewable resources was again discussed in FLS YK Farm, decided 
the same year as Progress Solar, but was not even mentioned in the 
Commission’s subsequent W.E. Partners and NC GreenPower 
decisions.144 
The Commission in Progress Solar also relied on the curious 
contention that “the light produced by the solar lighting systems 
cannot be used to generate electricity and thus be used indirectly to 
bypass the electric utilities’ exclusive franchises.”145 As noted earlier, 
this contention fails to recognize that the solar lighting system was 
powered by electricity produced by Progress Solar, rather than by the 
electric utility, and therefore did in fact “indirectly .	.	. bypass the 
 
 139. Nat’l Spinning Co., Docket No. SP-100, SUB 7, at 3 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 22, 
1996), 1996 WL 252627. 
 140. Id. at 7. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Progress Solar Invs., LLC, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 24, at 1, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 
4th (PUR) 525, 526 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Nov. 25, 2009), 2009 WL 4197406. 
 143. Id. at 3, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 528. 
 144. See supra Sections III.C–F. 
 145. Progress Solar, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 24, at 2, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 
at 527, 2009 WL 4197406. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2017) 
1626 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
electric utilities’ exclusive franchises.”146 The key factor in the 
Progress Solar decision, then, may well have been that the 
arrangement involved the production of electricity for a very limited 
purpose—to power environmentally-friendly lighting rather than for 
the general use of the customer. Very likely, the Commission saw this 
as such an uncommon arrangement that it did not present a 
significant competitive threat to the monopolistic position enjoyed by 
the public utility. 
While these pre-NC WARN decisions by the Utilities 
Commission are difficult to reconcile, two lessons can be drawn from 
them that make the Commission’s ultimate rejection of third-party 
financing in NC WARN more understandable. First, the decisions hint 
at different treatment for electricity than for other utility services 
(such as steam or natural gas). In Natural Power, for example, the 
Commission noted that the “end product” of the proposed 
arrangement was steam, which “has not been regulated to the same 
degree” as electricity.147 In FLS YK Farms, the Commission found 
relevant that the “output of the solar panels [would] be used solely to 
heat water belonging to [the customer],” and specifically noted that 
the output would not be used to generate electricity.148 Finally, the 
puzzling statement by the Commission in Progress Solar, that 
“[u]nlike steam or piped gas, the light produced by the solar lighting 
systems” at issue in that case could not be used to “generate 
electricity,” demonstrates that arrangements involving the generation 
of electricity receive heightened scrutiny from the Utilities 
Commission.149 Though not expressly stated in any of these decisions, 
the more rigorous regulation of electricity may be connected back to 
one of the “regulatory circumstances” enumerated in Simpson, the 
“nature of the industry sought to be regulated.”150 The importance of 
uninterrupted electric service to the welfare of both individuals and 
the economy serves as potential justification for the regulation (and 
resultant prohibition) of any arrangement that might disrupt the 
regulated electric industry. 
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A second, related lesson that may be distilled from the pre-NC 
WARN decisions is the strong protection from competitive pressures 
granted by the Utilities Commission to electric utilities. A minimal 
degree of competition for electric utilities appears to be acceptable to 
the Commission, but anything beyond this is prohibited. For example, 
the displacement of demand for electricity produced by the 
incumbent utility was deemed acceptable in Progress Solar, where the 
Commission approved the generation of electricity by a party selling 
eco-friendly lighting to a customer.151 However, the Commission 
deemed a more significant reduction in demand for electricity 
produced by the public utility unacceptable in National Spinning.152 
There the Commission expressed concern that allowing “unregulated 
electric suppliers” to “cherry pick” large industrial customers would 
upset the bargain at the heart of utilities regulation—namely, that 
public utilities must serve all customers in a designated geographic 
area and in exchange are granted a competitive monopoly in that 
area.153 
In National Spinning the Commission specifically mentioned its 
concern over increased costs that could result for consumers who 
would not be able to receive service from “unregulated electric 
suppliers.”154 Those increased costs would result, however, only if the 
Commission, which sets the price for electric service, seeks to 
maintain a consistent rate of return for the regulated utility.155 So it 
appears from the pre-NC WARN decisions that some minimal degree 
of competition for regulated utilities is acceptable, but more than that 
is not allowed. 
Furthermore, the degree of acceptable competition may differ 
from industry to industry. Going back to Simpson, the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina held that an unregulated, two-way radio service 
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that took approximately “45 [percent] of the available market” was 
too much competition to avoid regulation.156 Given the significant 
protection afforded by the Commission to the electric industry and 
the relative importance of that industry to the overall economy of the 
State (as compared to the two-way radio service at issue in Simpson), 
it would understandably take less competition before the Commission 
would intervene and deem a potential competitor to be a “public 
utility” in the context of providing electricity.157 
Again, though not expressly discussed in the pre-NC WARN 
decisions, this theme of allowing some, but not too much, competition 
relates back to one of the “regulatory circumstances” noted in 
Simpson: the “effect of non-regulation or exemption from regulation 
of one or more persons engaged in the industry.”158 In National 
Spinning, the Commission signaled that a degree of competition that 
may adversely impact the utility (by causing a loss from infrastructure 
investment) and other consumers (by increasing the cost of 
electricity) should result in regulation.159 On the other hand, the 
minimal degree of competition involved in Progress Solar, where the 
electric utility would lose business only when consumers opted for 
eco-friendly parking lot lighting, was apparently insignificant enough 
to avoid regulation.160 A company proposing a transaction with the 
potential of creating more than minimal competition with the 
incumbent electric utility, however, risks characterization as a public 
utility by the Utilities Commission. This concern over competition 
seems, at least implicitly, to constitute the basis for the Utilities 
Commission’s decision in NC WARN, as described in the next Part. 
IV.  THE UTILITIES COMMISSION’S DECISION IN NC WARN 
The Utilities Commission opinions described above led to the 
Commission’s April 2016 decision in NC WARN to prohibit the use of 
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power purchase agreements in North Carolina.161 In NC WARN, the 
Commission began its analysis by stating that “North Carolina by 
statute does not permit retail electric competition.”162 According to 
the Commission, this “prohibition is based on the economic principle 
that provision of public utility service for compensation is a service 
fixed with a public interest, and competition results in duplication of 
investment, economic waste and inefficient service, and high rates.”163 
The Commission stated that the North Carolina General Assembly 
previously studied the possibility of opening the electric industry in 
the State to competition, but decided to maintain the exclusive 
territorial franchises based on the “calamitous” experience in 
California when that state opened its electricity market to 
competition.164 Thus, the Commission implicitly relied on the Simpson 
factor of the “effect of non-regulation .	.	. of one or more persons 
engaged in the industry”165 in concluding that “the NC WARN 
 
 161. The Utilities Commission did not specifically address the permissibility of solar 
leases in the NC WARN decision, though invited to do so by one of the intervenors in the 
case. See Opening Comments of the Energy Freedom Coalition of America, LLC at 14, 
N.C. Waste Awareness and Reduction Network, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31 (N.C. Utils. 
Comm’n Oct. 30, 2015) (“[W]here the owner retains title to the equipment through a lease 
agreement and the customer has exclusive rights to enjoy the entire output of the system 
based on the consideration of fixed monthly payments made to the system owner—and 
not on consideration based on metered per kWh payments—the Commission should make 
clear that such arrangements do not involve the third-party sale of metered electricity.”). 
Some states have prohibited the use of PPAs but still allow solar leases. See Order 
Establishing Docket to Investigate the Development and Implementation of Net Metering 
Programs and Standards, Docket No. 2011-AD-2, at 18–19 (Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Dec. 
3, 2015), 2015 WL 8013234, at *11 (allowing solar lessees to participate in net metering, 
but not extending net metering to PPAs); compare PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 
So.2d 281, 282–83 (Fla. 1988) (prohibiting the use of PPAs in Florida) with FLA. ADMIN. 
CODE ANN. r. §	25-6.065(2)(a) (2017) (“The term ‘customer-owned renewable generation’ 
does not preclude the customer of record from contracting for the purchase, lease, 
operation, or maintenance of an on-site renewable generation system with a third-party 
under terms and conditions that do not include the retail purchase of electricity from the 
third party.”). 
 162. N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP-100, 
SUB 31, at 19 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n April 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1572367, at *20 (Order 
Issuing Declaratory Ruling) (“[t]he service area in Greensboro has been assigned 
exclusively to Duke, and other service areas in North Carolina have been assigned 
exclusively to other electric suppliers.”) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §	62-110.2 (2015)).  
 163. Id. at 19–20, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20 (citing State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. 
Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 267 N.C. 257, 271, 148 S.E.2d 100, 111 (1966) for the proposition 
that “nothing else appearing, the public is better served by a regulated monopoly than by 
competing suppliers of the service”). 
 164. Id. at 20, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20. 
 165. State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 524, 246 S.E.2d 753, 756 
(1978). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2017) 
1630 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
program in this case constitutes service to the public and is thus 
impermissible.”166 
In addition, the Commission found NC WARN subject to 
regulation based on the Commission’s interpretation of the statutory 
language defining “public utility.” As previously explained, the 
statutory definition contains an exception for self-generators, stating 
that “the term ‘public utility’ shall not include persons who construct 
or operate an electric generating facility, the primary purpose of 
which facility is for such person’s own use and not for the primary 
purpose of producing electricity .	.	. for sale to or for the public for 
compensation.”167 The Utilities Commission reasoned that the 
inclusion of this exception for self-generators, and the absence of any 
similar exception for solar financiers, amounted to “a clear legislative 
declaration that the provision of electric service for compensation to a 
third party .	.	. is service to the public and proscribed as an 
encroachment upon the certificated utility’s exclusive service 
rights.”168 
The Commission went on to state that it is within the exclusive 
authority of the General Assembly—and not within the authority of 
the Commission—to alter the policy of territorial franchises for the 
sale of electric services.169 It also cited another public policy concern 
in support of its decision to prohibit power purchase agreements, that 
allowing such agreements “presents the real probability that the 
public interest will not be well served as this will leave burdensome, 
less profitable service to the regulated incumbent and result in higher 
prices to the remaining customers for the service—the harm identified 
by the Court in Simpson.”170 According to the Commission, allowing 
third-party financing of solar PV systems would disturb the delicate 
balance between profit and service that the exclusive franchise for 
public utilities creates: “in exchange for their exclusive right to serve, 
the incumbent providers have an obligation to provide service to all, 
irrespective of the cost of doing so, at prices established through the 
regulatory, not the competitive, process.”171 
 
 166. NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 20, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20 (Order 
Issuing Declaratory Ruling). 
 167. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	62-3(23)(a)(1) (2015). 
 168. NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 20, 2016 WL 1572367, at *21 (Order 
Issuing Declaratory Ruling). 
 169. Id. at 21, 2016 WL 1572367, at *21. 
 170. Id. at 21, 2016 WL 1572367, at *22. 
 171. Id. 
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Finally, the Commission justified its prohibition against third-
party financing of solar PV systems by questioning its necessity.172 
After all, customer-owned solar PV systems are explicitly permitted 
under the exception to the definition of “public utility.”173 According 
to the Commission, “[i]t is unclear why NC WARN seeks to sell 
electricity to the Church rather than providing financing to the 
Church to be repaid through the savings NC WARN represents will 
be achieved from the electricity the PV facilities will generate.”174 The 
Commission explained that because NC WARN and Faith 
Community Church are both non-profit, tax-exempt organizations, 
there did not appear to be a tax justification for why NC WARN 
would need to retain ownership of the solar PV system, rather than 
simply providing financing for the church to purchase the system itself 
and thereby come within the self-generator exception.175 
A. Analysis of the NC WARN Decision 
Given the strong protection from competition granted to electric 
utilities under the pre-NC WARN decisions,176 as well as the 
conclusory statement in NC GreenPower that the North Carolina 
statutes prohibit “third-party sales of electricity by non-utility solar 
installers to retail customers[,]”177 it came as little surprise that the 
Commission ruled against allowing power purchase agreements in NC 
WARN. That said, there are several shortcomings to the 
Commission’s decision. 
First, the Commission failed to offer any explanation for how its 
decision in NC WARN is consistent with its previous decisions. In 
particular, the Commission provided no explanation for how the NC 
WARN decision reconciles with the statutory declaration of public 
policy favoring the use of renewable energy that the Commission 
found so important in Progress Solar and FLS YK Farm.178 The 
Commission in NC WARN did not even mention the pro-
environmental public policy declarations enacted into statute by the 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 21, 2016 WL 1572367, at *22 (noting “the ‘customer-owned’ generation 
exception in G.S. 62-3(23)a.1”). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 22, 2016 WL 1572367, at *23. 
 176. See supra Section III.G. 
 177. NC GreenPower, Docket No. E-100, SUB 90, at 3 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 27, 
2015), 2015 WL 399728, at *3. 
 178. See NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 19–22, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20–
23 (Order Issuing Declaratory Ruling); see also supra Sections III.C–D. 
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General Assembly, apparently giving little or no weight to these 
pronouncements.179 
Moreover, the NC WARN decision is inconsistent with the 
Commission’s previous decision to allow the sale of solar-powered 
lighting in Progress Solar, given the fact that the arrangement in that 
case displaced electricity sales that would have otherwise benefitted 
the incumbent public utility.180 Though not discussed by the 
Commission, one possible distinction between NC WARN and 
Progress Solar is that the electricity produced in Progress Solar was 
not actually sold to the customer.181 Instead, the electricity generated 
by Progress Solar was used to produce light, and it was the light that 
was then sold to the customer.182 Therefore, although Progress Solar 
involved the generation and use of electricity by a party other than 
the incumbent utility, the end product involved in that case was light, 
not electricity.183 Another distinction between Progress Solar and NC 
WARN may be the Commission’s belief about the potential 
competitive impact of the activity involved in each case. The market 
for solar-generated lighting considered in Progress Solar was much 
narrower than the market for solar-generated electricity at issue in 
NC WARN.184 Consequently, the Commission may have taken the 
view that arrangements like the one in Progress Solar do not pose a 
real competitive threat to the incumbent electric utility, while the 
potential growth of solar PV systems if third-party financing were 
allowed is much greater. 
In addition to its failure to adequately distinguish its previous 
decisions, the Utilities Commission in NC WARN relied on the same 
“cherry picking” concern expressed by the court in Simpson, but 
failed to provide any empirical data supporting that concern.185 As 
explained by the Commission, allowing unregulated sales of 
electricity through the use of power purchase agreements may result 
in the regulated utility losing its most profitable customers to solar 
 
 179. See NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 19–22, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20–
23 (Order Issuing Declaratory Ruling) (presenting other factors in deciding to regulate the 
transaction at hand). 
 180. See supra Section III.C. 
 181. Progress Solar Invs., LLC, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 24, at 1, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 
4th (PUR), 525, 526 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Nov. 25, 2009), 2009 WL 4197406. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 2, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 527. 
 185. N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP-100, 
SUB 31, at 21 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1572367, at *22 (Order 
Issuing Declaratory Ruling). 
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financiers.186 According to the Commission, “authorization of third-
party sales presents the real probability that the public interest will 
not be well served as this will leave burdensome, less profitable 
service to the regulated incumbent and result in higher prices to the 
remaining customers for the service.”187 However, the Commission 
cited no specific evidence that allowing power purchase agreements 
has such an effect. Unlike Simpson, where the unregulated offering of 
two-way radio service had already taken forty-five percent of the 
existing customer market from the incumbent utility, the 
Commission’s decision in NC WARN was based solely on theoretical 
speculation about the potential impact of allowing power purchase 
agreements.188 
Other states permit power purchase agreements, and those states 
provide a natural testing ground for assessing the Utilities 
Commission’s hypothesis. In a decision allowing power purchase 
agreements,189 the Iowa Supreme Court addressed the potential 
competitive impact of unregulated solar financiers on the incumbent 
utility in the following terms: 
If the third-party-PPA movement gets legs in Iowa, it is 
conceivable that demand for electricity from traditional utilities 
will be materially impacted in the long run. There is nothing in 
the record of this administrative proceeding, however, to gauge 
the likelihood or degree of material impact, and there was no 
suggestion that the integrity of the grid or economic health of 
regulated providers has been adversely affected in states such 
as California, Nevada, Arizona, and Colorado, where third-
party PPAs are not considered public utilities for purposes of 
regulation.190 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 21–22, 2016 WL 1572367, at *21–22. 
 189. See infra Part V. 
 190. SZ Enters., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 850 N.W.2d 441, 468 (Iowa 2014). Other states 
have also allowed third-party ownership of solar PV systems. See, e.g., SolarCity Corp., 
Docket No. E-20690A-09-0346, Decision No. 71795, at 71 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n July 12, 
2010), 2010 WL 2864938 (noting that company’s offering of on-site facility service to 
government and non-profit customers does not make it a public service corporation); 
Powerlight Corp., Docket No. 02-0182, Decision & Order No. 20633, at 8 (Haw. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n Nov. 13, 2003), 2003 WL 22966161; Investigation and Rulemaking to Adopt, 
Amend, or Repeal Regulations Pertaining to Chapters 703 and 704 of the Nevada 
Administrative Code, Docket Nos. 07-06024 & 07-06027, at 3–4 (Nev. Pub. Util. Comm’n 
Nov. 26, 2008), 2008 WL 5159179, at *2; Declaratory Order Regarding Third-Party 
Arrangements for Renewable Energy Generation, Case No. 09-00217-UT, at 13–14 (N.M. 
Pub. Reg, Comm’n Dec. 17, 2009); Honeywell Int’l, Inc., Docket No. DR 40, Order No. 
08-388, 1 (Pub. Util. Comm’n of Or. July 31, 2008), 2008 WL 3020892. But see Interpretive 
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Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court did not rely on mere speculation 
about the potential impact of PPAs on incumbent utilities, but instead 
noted that no evidence had been presented about adverse effects on 
utilities or the electricity markets in those states that have expressly 
permitted PPAs.191 
As for impact on consumers, the average retail price of electricity 
over the last seven years in the states listed by the Iowa Supreme 
Court as allowing PPAs192—Arizona,193 California,194 Colorado,195 and 
Nevada196—compared to the national average price of electricity, is as 
follows, listed in dollars per kWh:197 
 
 
Statement Concerning Jurisdiction and Regulation of Third-Party Owners of Net 
Metering Facilities, Docket No. UE-112133, at 36 (Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n (July 
30, 2014) (noting that the Commission may have limited jurisdiction over certain third-
party solar companies, but that the determination is fact specific and that it would consider 
a rulemaking to establish clear guidelines for limited regulation if the legislature did not 
address the issue in 2015). 
 191. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 468. 
 192. Id. 
 193. The Arizona Corporation Commission determined in July 2010 that third-party 
financing of solar PV systems did not render the solar financier a “public service 
corporation.” See Solar City, Docket No. E-20690A-09-0346, Decision No. 71795, at 70, 
2010 WL 2864938. 
 194. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §	218(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 179 of 2017 
Reg. Sess.). 
 195. See Renewable Energy Financing Act of 2009, ch. 157, §	11, 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws 
673, 679–80 (2009). 
 196. The Nevada Public Utilities Commission concluded in 2008 “that third party 
owners of net metered renewable energy systems is legal in Nevada.” See Investigation 
and Rulemaking to Adopt, Amend, or Repeal Regulations Pertaining to Chapters 703 and 
704 of the Nevada Administrative Code, Docket Nos. 07-06024 & 07-06027, at 3 (Nev. 
Pub. Util. Comm’n Nov. 26, 2008), 2008 WL 5159179, at *2. 
 197. The table shows the average retail price for all sectors: residential, commercial, 
industrial, transportation, and other. Electricity Data Browser, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g000000001i4&endsec=vg
&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&map
=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&end=2016&ctype=linechart&ltype=pin
&columnendpoints=1&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0 [https://perma.cc/7FN6-TMF9]. 
 Arizona California Colorado Nevada Nat’l Avg. 
2016 0.1040 0.1531 0.0976 0.0840 0.1028 
2015 0.1034 0.1542 0.0994 0.0948 0.1041 
2014 0.1018 0.1515 0.1006 0.0973 0.1044 
2013 0.1014 0.1430 0.0988 0.0903 0.1007 
2012 0.0981 0.1353 0.0939 0.0895 0.0984 
2011 0.0971 0.1305 0.0939 0.0897 0.0990 
2010 0.0969 0.1301 0.0915 0.0973 0.0983 
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The chart below shows the percentage change in the average 
retail price for one kilowatt of electricity in each of these states from 
2010 to 2016, as compared to the national average percentage change 
over the same period:198 
 
 Arizona California Colorado Nevada Nat’l Avg. 
% change 7.33 17.68 6.67 -13.67 4.58 
 
Thus, two of the states that have permitted power purchase 
agreements, Arizona and Colorado, experienced price increases in 
the retail cost of electricity slightly greater than the national average 
of 4.5%. Nevada saw a significant price decrease, and California saw a 
significant price increase. California’s price increase has been linked 
in academic literature to the price of natural gas and other factors 
such as enactment of a renewable portfolio standard that requires 
fifty percent of the state’s electricity to come from renewable sources 
by 2030.199 Therefore, the price increase in California is much more 
likely to have resulted from factors other than the fact that power 
purchase agreements are permitted in the state. 
In any event, the North Carolina Utilities Commission cited no 
empirical data in support of its concern over the potential competitive 
and price impacts that might result from allowing PPAs.200 Rather, in 
support of its position that allowing PPAs would have a detrimental 
impact on public utilities and consumers, the Commission cited to an 
old study prepared by the General Assembly Study Commission on 
the Future of Electric Service in North Carolina, which considered 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. See JONATHAN COOK, THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICTY PRICES IN CALIFORNIA: 
UNDERSTANDING MARKET DRIVERS AND FORECASTING PRICES TO 2040 4–5 (2013), 
https://eec.ucdavis.edu/files/02-06-2014-The-Future-of-Electricity-Prices-in-California
-Final-Draft-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2KE-4MQH]; see also Renewables Portfolio Standard 
(RPS), CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/portfolio/ [https://perma.cc
/WST3-JVNV] (setting forth the history of California’s renewable portfolio standard 
requirements). 
 200. See N. C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP-
100, SUB 31 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1572367 (Order Issuing 
Declaratory Ruling). The NC WARN decision does cite to a series of back-and-forth 
letters to the editor of Public Utilities Fortnightly, in which utilities executives and 
academics argue over the cost-shifting caused by net metering. See id. at 26 n.23, 2016 WL 
1572367, at *27 n.23. That part of the decision simply acknowledges that debate about the 
value of solar exists, but does not consider any empirical data about the actual 
consequences of allowing power purchase agreements. Id. 
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the much broader question of whether to deregulate the electricity 
market in North Carolina.201 
In addition, although the Commission cited to the “cherry 
picking” rationale described by the court in Simpson,202 the market 
for electricity is substantially different from the market for two-way 
radio service at issue in Simpson. Unlike the twenty-two users of 
communication services at issue in Simpson, the market for electricity 
in any particular geographic area is the entire population of that 
area.203 From that population, only a limited number of consumers 
will have the potential to use solar PV-generated electricity, given 
that some locations are unsuitable for the service due to a lack of 
direct sunlight or shared roof space, such as in an apartment 
complex.204 Moreover, practically all those who may be able to use 
solar PV-generated electricity will remain connected to the regulated 
electric grid, since very few consumers are able to satisfy all of their 
electricity needs exclusively through solar PV systems.205 Thus, while 
the Commission acknowledged the differences between the two-way 
radio market in Simpson and the market for electric service at issue in 
NC WARN,206 it did not explain why it chose to ignore those 
differences in reaching its conclusion that allowing PPAs would have 
a detrimental impact on both the public utility and its consumers. 
 
 201. See id. at 20 n.8, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20 n.8; see also STUDY COMMISSION ON 
THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC SERVICE IN NORTH CAROLINA, REPORT TO THE 1999 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA, 2000 REGULAR SESSION 1–2 (2000), 
http://digital.ncdcr.gov/cdm/ref/collection/p249901coll22/id/192853 [https://perma.cc/6UKQ-
FCTC] (“[T]he Commission has organized its work by viewing its charge as determining 
whether or not regulation of retail service of electricity should be changed in North 
Carolina to allow retail competition.”). The Study Commission recommended that “North 
Carolina make a commitment to enter the world of competitive retail electric service, with 
full retail choice of generation suppliers being available to all customers, on January 1, 
2006.” Id. at 3. Ultimately, however, the recommendation of the Study Commission was 
not followed due to concerns over the effects of deregulation in California. See Electric 
Industry Restructuring, N.C. UTILS. COMM’N, http://www.ncuc.commerce.state.nc.us/electric
/elecrest.htm [https://perma.cc/JX33-W96S]. 
 202. State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 525, 246 S.E.2d 753, 757 
(1978). 
 203. See id. at 525, 246 S.E.2d at 757 (describing the extremely limited market for two-
way radio services in Cleveland County, North Carolina). 
 204. As previously stated, a 2008 National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 
analysis estimated that only 1 in 5 residential roofs are likely to be suitable for solar 
systems. DENHOLM & MARGOLIS, supra note 157, at 4. 
 205. This is due to the fact that the production of electricity through a solar PV system 
is variable on weather and ceases outside of daylight hours. See Solar, INST. FOR ENERGY 
RES., http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/topics/encyclopedia/solar/ [https://perma.cc/X72V-
RP5Y]. 
 206. NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 20 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 
2016), 2016 WL 1572367, at *20–21 (Order Issuing Declaratory Ruling). 
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Finally, although the Commission did not address the 
“regulatory circumstances” from Simpson explicitly, the protective 
approach that the Commission took toward the incumbent utility is 
presumably based, at least in part, on one of these circumstances: the 
“nature of the industry.”207 The stability of the electric industry is 
essential to economic advancement, and therefore the Commission 
understandably proceeds with due care when considering changes 
that might affect the industry. That said, the statement by the Utilities 
Commission in NC WARN that “North Carolina by statute does not 
permit retail electric competition”208 appears to prohibit any activity 
that would potentially impact the incumbent utilities’ competitive 
monopoly, even if that activity furthers the General Assembly’s 
stated goals of using the “entire spectrum of demand-side options” to 
assure the “facilities necessary to meet future growth” and the goal of 
“diversify[ing] the resources used to reliably meet the energy needs of 
consumers in the State.”209 The Utilities Commission’s overly 
protective approach prohibiting any competition for the public 
utilities risks stifling innovation within the electric industry. 
As mentioned earlier, other states have allowed innovations such 
as third-party financing of solar PV systems without the adverse 
consequences feared by the Utilities Commission. The following 
section examines the 2014 decision by the Iowa Supreme Court in SZ 
Enterprises, which allowed the use of power purchase agreements in 
that state. 
V.  THE IOWA SUPREME COURT DECISION IN SZ ENTERPRISES, LLC 
V. IOWA UTILITIES BOARD210 
The arrangement at issue in SZ Enterprises, LLC v. Iowa Utilities 
Board was very similar to the one between NC WARN and Faith 
Community Church, but the analysis in the case illustrates a different 
approach than the one taken by the North Carolina Utilities 
Commission. SZ Enterprises, doing business under the name Eagle 
Point Solar, agreed to install and maintain a PV solar electric 
generating system on a building owned by the city of Dubuque.211 
Dubuque sought to “develop renewable energy for the use of the 
city[,]”212 consistent with “the policy of [the] state to encourage the 
 
 207. Id. at 18, 2016 WL 1572367, at *19. 
 208. Id. at 20, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20. 
 209. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	62-2(a) (2015). 
 210. 850 N.W.2d 441 (Iowa 2014). 
 211. Id. at 444–45. 
 212. Id. at 444. 
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development of alternate energy production facilities .	.	. in order to 
conserve [Iowa’s] finite and expensive resources and to provide for 
their most efficient use.”213 Under the power purchase agreement 
between Eagle Point and Dubuque, “[t]he city would purchase the 
full electric output of Eagle Point’s solar power generation facility on 
a per kWh basis, which escalated at a rate of three percent 
annually.”214 The PPA also provided that Eagle Point would own any 
renewable energy credits associated with the generation system, “but 
would credit to the city one third of any revenues received from the 
sale of those credits.”215 
As with the arrangement between Faith Community Church and 
NC WARN, the PV system owned and installed by Eagle Point for 
the city of Dubuque “would be on the customer side of the electric 
meter provided by the city’s electric utility, Interstate Power.”216 This 
meant that “electricity generated by the system would not pass 
through Interstate Power’s electric meter.”217 Moreover, the PV 
system would not fulfill all of the electrical needs of the city building 
where the system was to be located.218 Consequently, the building 
“would remain connected to the electric grid and [the city would] 
continue to purchase electric power from Interstate Power to meet its 
remaining needs at the premises.”219 
Confronting the Iowa Supreme Court was the issue of whether 
the terms of the proposed PPA rendered Eagle Point a “public 
utility” under Iowa law.220 If so, the “proposed arrangement with the 
city would be an unlawful incursion into the exclusive service territory 
of Interstate Power[,]” the city’s incumbent electric utility.221 In 
 
 213. Id. at 447 (citing IOWA CODE §	476.41 (West, Westlaw current with 2017 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 214. Id. at 444. 
 215. Id. at 444–45. 
 216. Id. at 445. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. In addition, if the court determined Eagle Point not to be a public utility, it 
would need to also consider whether the arrangement rendered Eagle Point an “electric 
utility[,]” id., defined under Iowa law as “includ[ing] a public utility furnishing electricity 
as defined in section 476.1 and a city utility as defined in section 390.1.” IOWA CODE 
§	476.22 (2017). After determining that Eagle Point was not a public utility, the SZ 
Enterprises court also found that the company was not an electric utility. SZ Enters., 850 
N.W.2d at 470. 
 221. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 445 (citing IOWA CODE §	476.25(3) (West, Westlaw 
current with 2017 Reg. Sess.). Under the Iowa Code, “[a]n electric utility shall not serve or 
offer to serve electric customers in an exclusive service area assigned to another electric 
utility, nor shall an electric utility construct facilities to serve electric customers in an 
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determining whether Eagle Point was a public utility, the court 
started with the statutory definition, which, in language almost 
identical to the equivalent North Carolina statute, defines “public 
utility” as “any person, partnership, business association, or 
corporation, domestic or foreign, owning or operating any facilities 
for [among other things] furnishing .	.	. electricity to the public for 
compensation.”222 Under Iowa law, a public utility that furnishes 
electricity (in contrast to other regulated commodities or services such 
as gas, water, or communication services) is further defined as an 
“electric utility.”223 As previously stated, Iowa provides exclusive 
territorial franchises for its electric utilities. As a result, just as in NC 
WARN, the Iowa Supreme Court in SZ Enterprises had to determine 
whether Eagle Point would, under the PPA, own or operate any 
facilities for furnishing electricity “to the public for compensation.”224 
If so, this would be prohibited under the incumbent electric utility’s 
exclusive territorial franchise. 
In determining whether Eagle Point was offering to furnish 
electricity “to the public,” the Iowa Supreme Court held that a 
company may come within this phrase even though it does not 
“directly or indirectly hold itself out as providing service to all 
comers.”225 Rather, sales “to the public,” as that phrase has been 
interpreted under Iowa law, means “sales to sufficient of the public to 
clothe the operation with a public interest and does not mean 
willingness to sell to each and every one of the public without 
discrimination.”226 Whether a specific activity, like Eagle Point’s 
furnishing of electricity to Dubuque (and future potential customers) 
under the terms of a PPA, constituted sales “to sufficient of the public 
 
exclusive serve area assigned to another electric utility.” IOWA CODE §	476.25(3). As 
explained in the Iowa statutes, the exclusive-territory provision is designed “to encourage 
the development of coordinated statewide electric service at retail, to eliminate or avoid 
unnecessary duplication of electric utility facilities, and to promote economical, efficient, 
and adequate electric service to the public.” Id. §	476.25. 
 222. IOWA CODE §	476.1(3) (emphasis added); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §	62-3 (2015). 
 223. IOWA CODE §	476.22. 
 224. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 460 (citing IOWA CODE §	476.1). 
 225. Id. at 454–55 (rejecting the “rigid test” used in a line of Colorado cases for 
determining whether a service or good is offered “to the public”). 
 226. Id. at 455, 474 (emphasis added) (citing Iowa State Commerce Comm’n v. N. Nat. 
Gas Co., 161 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Iowa 1968)). This is the same standard cited by the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina in State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 
524, 246 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1978). Rather than applying the same four “regulatory 
circumstances” as the Simpson court, id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756–57, the Iowa Supreme 
Court applied the eight factors identified in the Serv-Yu case, as discussed below. SZ 
Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 447, 470. 
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to clothe the operation with a public interest,”227 required the court to 
“examine the facts of [the] particular transaction on a case-by-case 
basis to determine whether the transaction cries out for public 
regulation.”228 To undertake this examination, the SZ Enterprises 
court stated that eight factors first set forth in an Arizona Supreme 
Court decision, known as the Serv-Yu factors, “provide a reasoned 
approach when considering the question of whether the activity 
involved is sufficiently clothed with the public interest to justify 
regulation.”229 In summary, the Iowa Supreme Court reasoned that 
sales of electricity are “to the public” if the sales are “to sufficient of 
the public to clothe the operation with a public interest,”230 which may 
be assessed by applying the so-called Serv-Yu factors, first laid out by 
the Arizona Supreme Court in Natural Gas Service Co. v. Serv-Yu 
Cooperative, Inc.231 
The Serv-Yu factors, as described by the Iowa Supreme Court in 
SZ Enterprises, are: (1) “a pragmatic assessment of what is actually 
happening in the transaction[;]”232 (2) whether the transaction is 
dedicated to public use[;]233 (3) an examination of the purpose of the 
entity involved in the transaction, as set forth in the entity’s articles of 
incorporation[;]234 (4) whether the transaction amounts to “an 
indispensable service that ordinarily cries out for public 
regulation[;]”235 (5) whether the entity involved in the transaction is 
“intending to monopolize the territory with a public service 
commodity[;]”236 (6) whether the entity accepts “substantially all 
requests for service[;]”237 (7) whether the entity instead reserves the 
right to discriminate in whether or not to provide the service[;] and 
(8) an examination of the “actual or potential competition” between 
the entity providing the service and the public utility.238 In SZ 
Enterprises, the Iowa Supreme Court proceeded through these factors 
one-by-one and ultimately concluded that “the balance of factors 
 
 227. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 455. 
 228. Id. at 466. 
 229. Id. (citing Nat. Gas Serv. Co. v. Serv-Yu Coop., Inc., 219 P.2d 324, 325–26 (Ariz. 
1950)). 
 230. Id. at 455. 
 231. 219 P.2d 324 (Ariz. 1950). 
 232. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 466. 
 233. Id. at 467. 
 234. Id. at 458. 
 235. Id. at 467. 
 236. Id. at 448 (quoting Nat. Gas Serv. Co. v. Serv-Yu Coop., Inc., 219 P.2d 324, 326 
(Ariz. 1950)). 
 237. Id. (quoting Nat. Gas Serv. Co., 219 P.2d at 326). 
 238. Id. at 467. 
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point away from a finding that the third-party PPA for a behind-the-
meter solar generation facility is sufficiently ‘clothed with the public 
interest’ to trigger regulation.”239 
While the SZ Enterprises court moved summarily through some 
of the Serv-Yu factors,240 other factors received more extensive 
consideration. With respect to the first factor, “a pragmatic 
assessment of what is actually happening in the transaction[,]” the 
court said that the PPA could be “characterized as a sale of electricity 
or a method of financing a solar rooftop operation,” and that 
“[n]either characterization is inaccurate.”241 Regardless of its 
characterization, however, the court stated that “most importantly” 
the transaction “is an arms-length transaction between a willing buyer 
and a willing seller.”242 As such, “[t]here is no reason to suspect any 
unusual potential for abuse[,]” which would have served as a 
justification for regulation.243 Rather, the court stated that “[f]rom a 
consumer protection standpoint, there is no reason to impose 
regulation on this type of individualized and negotiated 
transaction.”244 The court further stated in its discussion of the first 
Serv-Yu factor that what was happening as a result of the PPA could 
have been accomplished without legal controversy through self-
financing or through a “standard lease[,]” pursuant to which Eagle 
Point would lease the solar PV system to the city and the city would 
use the leased equipment to generate its own electricity.245 
That the use of a solar PV system could be achieved through self-
financing or through one form of third-party financing (leasing the 
system) but not through another (financing the same system through 
a PPA) appears to have been too much for the SZ Enterprises court 
to accept. Given the permissibility of a lease arrangement, the court 
stated that “the actual issue here is not the supplying of electricity 
through behind-the-meter solar facilities, but the method of 
financing.”246 Consequently, the court ultimately treated a PPA as just 
 
 239. Id. at 468. 
 240. The third factor in particular did not receive consideration from the SZ 
Enterprises court in their analysis. See id. at 466–68. 
 241. Id. at 466. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. According to the court, “the [Iowa Utilities Board] would not seek to regulate 
behind-the-meter solar installations that are owned by the host or which operate pursuant 
to a standard lease.” Id. The court also said that Eagle Point and the City of Dubuque had 
in fact converted their PPA into a lease “in order to remove the shadow of the legal cloud 
raised by this case.” Id. at 466 n.6. 
 246. Id. at 466. 
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another method for consumers to reduce their dependence on electric 
utilities, much like high-efficiency windows, insulation, and LED 
lighting.247 Self-financed solar production is permitted; solar 
production through a traditional lease arrangement is permitted (at 
least in Iowa); and energy conservation measures such as those listed 
above, all of which reduce consumption of utility-generated 
electricity, are also permitted.248 That being the case, the court found 
it difficult to justify prohibiting PPAs, the preferred financing method 
for companies and individuals who cannot afford to self-finance or do 
not want to assume the risk associated with a solar lease arrangement. 
The court also discussed the fourth Serv-Yu factor, and 
concluded that the commodity at issue in the case, on-site, solar-
generated electricity, was “not an indispensable service that ordinarily 
cries out for regulation.”249 The vast majority of solar customers 
remain connected to the grid.250 This is an important point for two 
reasons. First, unlike the situation with centralized electricity-
generating facilities of the type traditionally operated by public 
utilities, if there is a failure of an on-site solar PV system the customer 
continues to receive electricity through the grid system.251 The risk of 
failure is limited to the individual PV system, rather than to a more 
widespread segment of the electric grid. Second, unlike the traditional 
public utility, which is often the only provider of an essential service, 
“if Eagle Point decides not to engage in a transaction with a customer, 
the customer is not left high and dry, but may seek another vendor 
while continuing to be served by a regulated electric utility.”252 
Consumers have traditionally been at a bargaining disadvantage vis-à-
vis public utilities because the consumers absolutely must have the 
service provided by the public utility and the public utility is the 
exclusive provider of that service.253 This justification for regulation 
does not apply in the context of on-site solar PV systems since the 
consumer’s need for the essential service is already met by the public 
utility, and the use of an on-site solar PV system is instead a 
discretionary decision by the system host.254 
 
 247. Id. at 467 (stating that the solar panel “installation is no more dedicated to public 
use than the thermal windows or extra layers of insulation in the building itself”). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. (“All of Eagle Point’s customers remain connected to the public grid.”). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. (“There is simply nothing in the record to suggest that Eagle Point is a six 
hundred pound economic gorilla that has cornered defenseless city leaders in Dubuque.”). 
 254. See infra Part VI. 
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Finally, with respect to the last Serv-Yu factor, the “actual or 
potential competition with other corporations whose business is 
clothed with the public interest[,]”255 the court acknowledged that 
“[i]f the third-party-PPA movement gets legs in Iowa, it is 
conceivable that demand for electricity from traditional utilities will 
be materially impacted in the long run.”256 This competition, and the 
resulting price increase for consumers who may not be able to receive 
service from the unregulated service provider, was the primary 
rationale for the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in 
Simpson, as well as the North Carolina Utilities Commission’s 
decision in NC WARN. As stated in Simpson, “unregulated radio 
services might focus on classes which are easier and more profitable 
to serve. The result would be to leave burdensome, less profitable 
service on the regulated portion resulting inevitably in higher prices 
for the service.”257 
As previously explained in the discussion of Simpson, however, a 
statewide solar PV market is different in important ways from the 
Cleveland County market for two-way radio service. The two-way 
radio market at issue in Simpson was so small that the court could 
point to the substantial impact that an unregulated provider of 
communication services was already having on the market.258 In 
contrast, the Utilities Commission in NC WARN cited and discussed 
no empirical evidence of the effect that permitting PPAs would have 
on the market for electricity. Despite having no such empirical 
evidence, the North Carolina Utilities Commission chose to prohibit 
PPAs.259 In contrast, the Iowa Supreme Court in SZ Enterprises 
treated the lack of any evidence of a negative impact in states that 
have allowed PPAs as offering “no suggestion that the integrity of the 
grid or economic health of regulated providers has been adversely 
affected” by the use of power purchase agreements.260 
A. The SZ Enterprises Decision in Relation to NC WARN 
Up to a point, North Carolina law and Iowa law track one 
another in determining what activities result in a company being 
 
 255. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 458. 
 256. Id. at 468. 
 257. State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 525, 246 S.E.2d 753, 757 
(1978). 
 258. Id. 
 259. N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP-100, 
SUB 31, at 30 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1572367, at *31 (Order 
Issuing Declaratory Ruling). 
 260. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 468. 
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treated as a “public utility.” The statutory language defining a public 
utility is virtually identical in both states. North Carolina defines a 
public utility as a “person .	.	. owning or operating in this State 
equipment or facilities for .	.	. furnishing electricity .	.	. for the 
production of light, heat or power to or for the public for 
compensation”261; Iowa defines a public utility as “any person .	.	. 
owning or operating any facilities .	.	. for furnishing electricity to the 
public for compensation.”262 In addition, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina in Simpson expressed agreement with an earlier Iowa 
Supreme Court decision stating that the determination of what 
constitutes a public utility requires some degree of flexibility and 
should consider whether there are “sales to sufficient of the public to 
clothe the operation with a public interest.”263 According to Simpson, 
this “ad hoc” approach taken by the Iowa Supreme Court is the “type 
of flexible interpretation that is necessary to comport legislative 
purpose with the variable nature of modern technology.”264 
The laws in North Carolina and Iowa diverge, however, in the 
factors considered in assessing whether a certain activity renders the 
entity performing that activity a public utility. North Carolina law 
applies the four “regulatory circumstances” first set forth in Simpson; 
Iowa law applies the eight Serv-Yu factors. Consideration of those 
different sets of factors provides insight as to why the North Carolina 
Utilities Commission and the Iowa Supreme Court reached different 
conclusions about whether power purchase agreements trigger 
regulation as a public utility. 
The first regulatory circumstance identified by the North 
Carolina Supreme Court in Simpson was the “nature of the industry 
sought to be regulated.”265 The Serv-Yu factors do not include 
anything comparable. Of course, the electric industry plays an 
essential role in modern life, both at the individual level and at the 
broader societal level. Our economy and our standard of living are 
based on access to reliable and affordable electricity. Thus, the 
“nature of the industry sought to be regulated,” when considering the 
electric industry, is justifiably characterized as indispensable.266 
 
 261. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	62-3(23)(a)(1) (2015). 
 262. IOWA CODE §	476.1 (West, Westlaw current with 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 263. Simpson, 295 N.C. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 757 (quoting Iowa State Commerce 
Comm’n. v. N. Nat. Gas Co., 161 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Iowa 1968)). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756. 
 266. The indispensability of electricity has been recognized for generations, as stated in 
1932 by then candidate for President Franklin Roosevelt, “[e]lectricity is no longer a 
luxury. It is a definite necessity.” Franklin Roosevelt, Presidential Candidate, Campaign 
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It is important to note, however, that the Simpson case did not 
involve an issue related to the electric industry, and therefore the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina did not illustrate how to apply this 
factor in the context of the electric industry. Subsequent Utilities 
Commission decisions like National Spinning and W.E. Partners have 
given a substantial degree of protective treatment to the electric 
industry.267 These decisions signal a clear reluctance by the Utilities 
Commission to allow activity that has even the potential to adversely 
affect electric utilities, and the Utilities Commission can point to the 
first Simpson factor, the “nature of the industry[,]” to justify this 
extremely protective treatment.268 The Commission’s decisions have 
not always expressly stated this rationale as the basis for the special 
treatment given to the electric industry. 
This protective approach for the electric industry, based on the 
“nature of the industry sought to be regulated,” may have the effect 
of slowing innovation in the electric industry.269 The attention given to 
the “nature of the industry” also prevents the case-by-case assessment 
for determining whether regulation that the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina claimed to espouse in Simpson is appropriate. No matter 
what the specific facts involved in a particular case, the nature of the 
electric industry remains the same, essential to our way of life and our 
economy, and consequently there will always be a justification for 
regulating (i.e., preventing) proposed activities in the electric 
industry. 
In contrast, the Serv-Yu factors applied by the Iowa Supreme 
Court in SZ Enterprises do not contain a factor that considers the 
“nature of the industry sought to be regulated.” Instead, one of the 
Serv-Yu factors, which does not have an analog under Simpson, seeks 
to determine “[w]hat the corporation actually does.”270 This factor 
examines the nature of the activity undertaken by the entity, rather 
than the nature of the industry in which that entity acts. SZ 
Enterprises illustrates this distinction. Ultimately, the court in SZ 
Enterprises found that while Eagle Point was selling electricity to the 
 
Address in Portland, Oregon on Public Utilities and Development of Hydro-Electric 
Power (Sept. 21, 1932), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88390 [https://perma.cc
/X4A3-V89T]. 
 267. See W.E. Partners I, LLC, Docket No. SP-729, SUB 1, at 2 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n 
Sept. 17, 2012), 2012 WL 4320931; Nat’l Spinning Co., Docket No. SP-100, SUB 7, at 7 
(N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 22, 1996), 1996 WL 252627. 
 268. Simpson, 295 N.C. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756. 
 269. Id. 
 270. SZ Enters. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 850 N.W.2d 441, 458 (listing the eight Serv-Yu 
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City of Dubuque under the power purchase agreement, what the 
company was really doing was providing a mechanism for the city to 
finance a solar PV system.271 And although Eagle Point was operating 
within the electric industry by providing financing for solar PV 
systems, the nature of that industry itself was not relevant to the 
determination of whether the particular activity engaged in by Eagle 
Point should be regulated by the Iowa Utilities Board. What was 
relevant (along with the other Serv-Yu factors) was that the sales of 
electricity from Eagle Point to the City of Dubuque was simply 
facilitating the city’s ability to afford a solar PV system.272 That, the 
SZ Enterprises court found, did not weigh against regulation by the 
Iowa Utilities Board.273 
An advantage to the approach taken by the Iowa Supreme Court 
in applying the Serv-Yu factors over the Simpson factors applied in 
North Carolina is that the approach taken in Iowa allows for a greater 
degree of innovation while still considering whether the proposed 
activity will adversely affect the market in question. The Simpson 
factors include the “effect of non-regulation or exemption from 
regulation of one or more persons engaged in the industry.”274 
Likewise, the Serv-Yu factors include the “[a]ctual or potential 
competition with other corporations whose business is clothed with 
the public interest.”275 Thus, both tests allow for the protection of the 
market and the public utility operating in that market, but the North 
Carolina approach unduly constrains developments in that market by 
focusing on the general nature of the industry involved. 
Despite the various shortcomings to the NC WARN decision 
described in Part IV, it was arguably decided correctly by the Utilities 
Commission in light of the controlling Simpson case, and specifically 
in light of the first regulatory factor from Simpson. That said, whether 
the result in NC WARN has a solid theoretical foundation is another 
question. The next part examines the issue of whether PPAs should 
trigger regulation based on fundamental policy considerations. 
VI.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN REGULATING SOLAR FINANCIERS 
Whether one prefers the result reached by the Iowa Supreme 
Court allowing power purchase agreements or the North Carolina 
 
 271. Id. at 466 (“[T]he actual issue here is not the supplying of electricity through 
behind-the-meter solar facilities, but the method of financing.”). 
 272. See id. at 466–68. 
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 274. Simpson, 295 N.C. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756. 
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Utilities Commission prohibiting them may well turn on one’s views 
on the seriousness of climate change and the urgency for increasing 
the use of clean energy to slow global warming. Differing views on 
those issues may prove difficult to bridge, but the more general 
question of when the Utilities Commission should exert its 
jurisdictional authority may be considered separate from the context 
of one’s views on climate change. Courts and policy-makers have 
traditionally cited several policy reasons for regulating public utilities. 
With respect to electric utilities, these policy reasons have typically 
included: ensuring the reliable delivery of an essential commodity; 
protecting consumers from high prices; and avoiding waste through 
the unnecessary duplication of capital assets.276 As explained by the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
[r]etail electricity markets in the United States remain 
regulated in most states in part to protect consumers (rates and 
reliability) and to ensure a highly functioning electric grid. If 
anyone could freely connect a generator to the existing grid, the 
electricity supply could become volatile and unsafe, which 
could cause congestion, blackouts, and maintenance concerns. 
Additionally, regulation of these markets prevents unnecessary 
duplication of assets such as transmission and distribution 
facilities. Regulated investor-owned utilities are given 
monopoly status in most service territories to prevent such 
problems. By having a single entity control the system, a utility 
can balance constantly changing supply and demand to ensure 
reliability and keep the electricity flow on the grid optimized 
and safe.277 
These same justifications for regulation have been recognized by 
various courts and administrative bodies. In SZ Enterprises, for 
example, the Iowa Supreme Court acknowledged that certain 
commodities, such as electricity, “may be essential to commerce or 
everyday life,” and therefore “the continued provision of the service 
on a reliable basis may trigger a public interest” justifying 
regulation.278 Similarly, the Missouri Public Service Commission has 
explained the theoretical justifications for regulating utilities as 
follows: 
 
 276. See KATHERINE KOLLINS, BETHANY SPEER, & KARLYNN CORY, NAT’L 
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., SOLAR PV PROJECT FINANCING: REGULATORY AND 
LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES FOR THIRD-PARTY PPA SYSTEM OWNERS 4 (Feb. 2010), 
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[T]o preserve and promote those services which are 
indispensable to large segments of our population, and to 
prevent excessive and discriminatory rates and inferior service 
where the nature of the facilities used in providing the service 
and the disparity in the relative bargaining power of a utility 
ratepayer are such as to prevent the ratepayer from demanding 
a high level of service at a fair price without the assistance of 
governmental intervention in his behalf.279 
The traditional rationales for regulating electric utilities do not 
apply, however, to the provision of electricity under a power purchase 
agreement. First, practically all consumers who install solar PV 
systems remain connected to the electric grid.280 This may be due to 
the variable and unpredictable production of electricity by solar PV 
systems at any particular moment in time281 or due to the cap on the 
amount of tax incentives available for the installation of a solar PV 
system.282 Whatever the reason for not completely displacing the 
consumer’s need for electricity from the grid, the electricity from a 
solar PV system used by a consumer still connected to the grid should 
be viewed as a cost-effective and environmentally-beneficial 
supplement to grid-supplied electricity, rather than as the sole source 
of an essential component of daily life.283 The consumer does not need 
 
 279. Geldbach Petroleum Co., Case No. 15490, 56 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 207, 213 
(Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Oct. 13, 1964), 1964 WL 129905; see also Trico Elec. Coop., v. 
Corp. Comm’n of Ariz., 339 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1959) (“The trial court was justified in 
finding that convenience and necessity required its regulation to prevent competition with 
public utilities under the principle of regulated monopolies to prevent waste and 
duplication in service.”). 
 280. FELDMAN & BOLINGER, supra note 18, at 18 (“Most residential systems rely on 
the electricity grid (rather than a battery) to manage the mismatch between their 
building’s load profile and their PV system’s generation profile, using net metering to 
compensate them for electricity fed back into the grid.”). 
 281. Simply put, if the sun is not shining, the solar PV system is not generating 
electricity. To hedge against “rainy days,” most consumers remain connected to the 
traditional electric grid. 
 282. In North Carolina, for example, the state income tax credit for the purchase of a 
solar PV system (before its expiration at the end of 2015) was capped at $10,500. N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §	105-129.16A(c)(2)(d) (2015); see also N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE 
GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING THE TAX CREDIT FOR INVESTING IN RENEWABLE 
ENERGY PROPERTY 12 (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.dornc.com/taxes/corporate/renewable
_energy_credits.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TRD-N7AY]. Therefore, purchasers of solar PV 
systems in North Carolina were economically motivated to limit the size (and therefore 
the potential output) of the systems they purchased. 
 283. Some proponents of distributed solar have argued that because on-site solar PV 
systems provide electricity on the “customer side” of the meter, meaning that the 
customer consumes the electricity from the solar PV system before drawing any electricity 
from the grid, these systems should be considered and treated equivalent to other energy 
efficiency measures that operate to reduce the amount of electricity consumed from the 
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to depend on the electricity produced by the solar PV system, since 
electricity from the grid remains available at all times. Consequently, 
while the provision of electricity through the grid is unquestionably 
an indispensable service to the public, the decision to supplement 
grid-supplied electricity with electricity from a solar PV system 
amounts to a discretionary purchase by the consumer. This is, of 
course, evidenced by the fact that a very small percentage of the 
overall population receives electricity from on-site solar PV 
systems.284 Thus, the traditional justification for regulating an 
“indispensable service” does not apply to solar PV systems when the 
consumer remains connected to the electric grid. 
The second traditional justification for regulation, protection of 
consumers from overpricing, is also inapplicable to solar PV systems. 
Due to the high capital costs associated with generation, transmission, 
and distribution of electricity to large numbers of consumers, and the 
resulting barrier to competition resulting from these costs, electric 
utilities have historically been considered natural monopolies.285 A 
natural monopoly which sells a good or service essential to modern 
life, like electricity, has disproportionate bargaining power relative to 
individual consumers. The result of this disparity in bargaining power 
is the potential for the natural monopoly to overprice the good or 
service. Government regulation, and price regulation in particular, 
has served as an effective check on this potential abuse in pricing. 
That disparity in bargaining power and the resulting potential for 
over-pricing does not apply to distributed solar, however, for several 
reasons. These include the non-essential nature of on-site, solar-
generated electricity; the lower cost of entry for suppliers in the 
distributed solar market; and the competition within that market. 
Because most users of distributed solar electricity remain connected 
 
grid, such as high-efficiency bulbs or weather-proof windows. See SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d 
at 467. The comparison to other energy saving measures breaks down, however, because 
solar PV systems produce electricity, rather than just reducing the need for electricity. In 
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 284. The Solar Energy Industries Association estimates that the U.S. reached one 
million solar installations nationwide in 2016. See Million Solar Strong, SOLAR ENERGY 
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 285. See Douglas Gegax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Industry: 
An Evaluation, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 75 (1993) (concluding that electric utilities are 
multiproduct natural monopolies). 
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to the grid, and even those who do not remain connected have the 
option to do so, solar PV systems do not fit the natural monopoly 
model. An individual consumer may choose to receive some, or even 
all, of the consumer’s electricity needs from an on-site solar PV 
system, but if that consumer elects otherwise or finds the cost of solar-
generated electricity to be too high, the grid provides an available 
source of electricity to meet the consumer’s needs. Put differently, the 
decision to enter into a power purchase agreement is entirely elective, 
unlike the decision to receive electric service generally. 
In addition, relative to the exceptionally high cost of building 
generating stations and systems for transmitting and distributing 
electricity over a large area like public utilities do, the cost of entering 
the on-site solar PV market is substantially lower. As evidenced by 
the NC WARN case, a supplier of solar PV systems may enter the 
market without the extensive capital necessary to construct large-
scale electric plants.286 Simply stated, distributed solar is not a natural 
monopoly because of the availability of electricity from the grid and 
the lower barrier to entry into the distributed solar market. This 
lower barrier to entry allows for robust competition among solar PV 
system suppliers, at least in states that allow attractive financing 
options like power purchase agreements. Therefore, the potential for 
overpricing is checked by the traditional grid, the lower barrier to 
entry, and the resulting competition within the distributed solar 
market. 
The final traditional justification for regulation of utilities is the 
avoidance of unnecessary and wasteful duplication of capital assets. 
This also has no relevance when considering distributed solar PV 
systems. Unlike a competing electric utility, which would have to 
replicate a centralized generation facility, as well as the means for 
transmission and distribution of the electricity, distributed solar is 
located on-site and behind the meter of the consumer. There simply is 
no duplication of the capital assets used by the incumbent electric 
utility in producing and transmitting electricity. In fact, given that 
excess electricity generated by distributed solar PV systems is fed 
back into the grid through net metering programs, the regulated 
utility’s capital assets may be more fully utilized with more distributed 
solar PV systems in operation. Since solar production is at its peak on 
 
 286. See N. C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP-
100, SUB 31, at 2 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1572367, at *2 (Order 
Issuing Declaratory Ruling) (explaining that NC WARN intended to use the revenue 
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sunny days, when demand for electricity is usually at its highest, the 
feeding of excess electricity into the grid by distributed solar PV 
systems may actually increase efficiency by reducing the need for the 
construction of additional generation facilities by the regulated 
utility.287 
Thus, the three traditional justifications for regulating an 
activity—ensuring reliable service, protecting consumers from over-
pricing, and avoiding waste—do not apply to the solar PV market. 
Moreover, other policy considerations weigh in favor of allowing 
PPAs. One such consideration is the security of the electric system 
from external threats, particularly cyber-attack or terrorist threats. 
Regulation of a centralized system of electricity generation, 
transmission, and distribution is warranted, in part, to reduce the 
vulnerability of the system from security risks. If the grid were to fail, 
the public would suffer widespread economic hardship and 
detrimental effects on the standard of living. Distributed solar does 
not have that same vulnerability. On-site solar PV systems typically 
serve a single consumer.288 Therefore, the failure of such a system is 
far less significant than the type of system-wide failure possible with a 
traditional electric utility. In addition, as previously discussed, most 
solar PV system users remain connected to the electric grid. 
Consequently, should a solar PV system fail, the user continues to 
receive electricity through the grid, resulting in no loss of electricity 
service for the user. 
Equitable considerations also weigh in favor of allowing PPAs. 
This is particularly the case in a state like North Carolina, which has a 
generous net metering policy but prevents those without the 
resources to purchase solar PV systems outright from taking 
advantage of that policy. The cost of solar PV systems has decreased 
significantly in the last five years.289 Even so, paying the upfront cost 
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investments in generation, transmission and distribution, improved system reliability, and 
reduced risk from fuel-cost volatility.” See Charles J. Cicchetti & Jon Wellinghoff, Solar 
Battle Lines: The Fight Over Customer Rooftops, Grid Funding, and Net Metering, 153 No. 
12 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 18, 19 (Dec. 2015). 
 288. There is a recent trend, however, for states to allow “community” solar PV 
systems. Under these arrangements, more than one consumer is served by the same local 
solar PV system. For a description of community solar, see Community and Shared Solar, 
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://energy.gov/eere/sunshot/community-and-shared-solar 
[https://perma.cc/YUK3-BMTV]. 
 289. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory reports that the “median reported 
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for a solar PV system is still beyond the reach of most Americans. 
This is particularly the case for racial minorities, whose median 
household income and overall wealth lags significantly behind 
Americans as a whole.290 In general, lower income households have 
not been able to take advantage of the reduced cost for solar PV 
systems. As explained in a working paper by George Washington 
University’s GW Solar Institute, “[t]he 49.1 million households that 
earn less than $40,000 of income per year make up 40 percent of all 
US households but only account for less than five percent of solar 
installations.”291 
Some commentators have speculated about the possibility of an 
“electrical divide[,]” in which the wealthy benefit from the cost 
savings of clean energy, while the less-well-off are left bearing the 
burden of an antiquated and less reliable traditional grid system.292 
While allowing third-party financing, such as power purchase 
agreements, may not solve all of the equitable issues involved in 
affording solar PV systems,293 it does allow greater access to 
distributed solar generation for middle- and low-income Americans, 
including members of minority groups. 
The policy and equitable considerations discussed in this Part 
indicate that the regulation of PPAs lacks a sound theoretical 
foundation. Consequently, North Carolina law should permit the use 
 
which is 40% less than the $44,000 a similarly sized system would have cost in 2010.” 
FELDMAN & BOLINGER, supra note 18, at 18. 
 290. The national median household income was $53,657 in 2014 for all Americans, but 
was lower for Latino ($42,491) and Black ($35,398) Americans. CARMEN DENAVAS-
WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 5, (Sept. 2015), www.census.gov/library/publications/2015
/demo/p60-252.html [https://perma.cc/5NXH-UZHY]; see also Rakesh Kochhar & Richard 
Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End of Great 
Recession, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
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Institute, Working Paper, 2015), http://solar.gwu.edu/research/bridging-solar-income-gap 
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/uploads/2017/03/Policy-Guide_3.7.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/64Y9-5ZJW] (discussing the 
disparate effect of credit scores on access to solar through third-party financing 
arrangements, including PPAs). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2017) 
2017] SOLAR FINANCING IN N.C. 1653 
of PPAs, which would allow for more ready access to distributed solar 
for the average North Carolinian. In Part VII, this Article prescribes 
possible judicial and statutory solutions to allow for the use of PPAs. 
VII.  PRESCRIPTIONS FOR SOLAR FINANCING IN NORTH 
CAROLINA294 
Given the lack of theoretical foundation for regulating solar 
financiers, the NC WARN decision establishes an unjustified barrier 
to the spread of distributed solar PV systems. That barrier may be 
overcome, however, through action by either the General Assembly 
or the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 
Legislative action could render the NC WARN decision moot by 
explicitly permitting third-party financing for solar PV systems in 
North Carolina. This was proposed during the 2015 session of the 
North Carolina General Assembly through House Bill 245, the 
“Energy Freedom Act.”295 The Energy Freedom Act would have 
amended the definition of a public utility to include a second 
exception (in addition to the exception for self-financing) for “a 
person who constructs or operates a renewable energy facility on the 
site of a customer’s property and sells the electricity produced by such 
facility to that customer, as provided by and subject to the limitations 
of G.S. 62-119.”296 The referenced “limitations of G.S. 62-119” stated 
that the third-party owner of the renewable energy facility (i.e., the 
financier under a PPA) would not be treated as a public utility  
so long as (i) the facility is sized to supply no more than one 
hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the average annual 
consumption of electricity by the customer at that site and (ii) 
the third-party owner reports to the Utilities Commission the 
proposed construction of such a facility prior to the beginning 
of construction.297 
The Energy Freedom Act was referred to a House committee 
but did not emerge, as it faced opposition from the state’s electric 
utilities.298 One modification that could make the proposed legislation 
more palatable to its opponents, however, is a limitation not only on 
the relative size of any on-site “renewable energy facility,” as the 
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Energy Freedom Act included with the 125% “limitation[] of G.S. 62-
119,”299 but also on the absolute size of the facility. In other words, the 
legislation could cap the size of any solar PV system to a specified 
number of kilowatts, if the system is owned by third-party financiers 
rather than by the host property owner. Such a cap would effectively 
limit the exception from the definition of “public utility” to 
residential and smaller commercial and non-profit customers. This 
would address the “cherry picking” concern identified in Simpson, 
National Spinning, and NC WARN.300 By capping the absolute size of 
the third-party financing exception in the definition of a public utility, 
the General Assembly would ensure that public utilities would not 
lose their largest customers or fail to make fair returns on 
infrastructure investments built to serve those customers. 
Since the median size of residential solar PV systems in the 
United States is 6.1 kilowatts,301 a limit of 10 kilowatts would capture 
most residential and smaller commercial systems. Changing the 
proposed legislation to include such a cap could be accomplished by 
simply modifying the “limitation[] of G.S. 62-119” to state that the 
third-party owner of the renewable energy facility would not be 
treated as a public utility “so long as (i) the facility is sized to supply 
no more than (A) one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the 
average annual consumption of electricity by the customer at that site 
or (B) ten (10) kilowatts, whichever is smaller.” By adding this 
limitation and addressing the “cherry picking” concern identified in 
previous Supreme Court of North Carolina and Utilities Commission 
decisions, the proposed legislation may be more acceptable to those 
who opposed the previously-introduced Energy Freedom Act. 
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 300. This “cherry picking” concern has been identified in other contexts by courts and 
regulators confronted with the issue of whether particular activity should result in an 
entity being regulated as a public utility. See, e.g., Nat. Gas Serv. Co. v. Serv-Yu Coop., 
Inc., 219 P.2d 324, 328 (1950) (“What appellant seeks to do is to pick out certain industrial 
consumers in select territory and serve them under special contracts to the exclusion of all 
others except such private or domestic consumers as may suit its convenience and 
advantage. There were other industrial consumers with whom the appellant refused or 
failed to agree and so did not serve them. If such consumers were served at all, it must 
necessarily be by a competitor. If a business so carried on may escape public regulation 
then there would seem to be no valid reason why appellant may not extend the service to 
double, triple, or many times the number now served without being amenable to 
regulative measures.” (quoting Indus. Gas Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 21 N.E.2d 
166, 168 (1939))). But see SW Gas Corp. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 818 P.2d 714, 722–23 
(1991) (rejecting the incumbent natural gas utility’s argument that El Paso Natural Gas 
Company should be regulated as a “public service corporation” because it constituted a 
competitive threat to the utility). 
 301. FELDMAN & BOLINGER, supra note 18, at 18. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2017) 
2017] SOLAR FINANCING IN N.C. 1655 
If a legislative fix is not possible, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina should reconsider the “regulatory circumstances” that it 
introduced in Simpson. An opportunity for doing this may occur 
through the appeal of the Utilities Commission’s NC WARN 
decision.302 With the exception of the “effect of non-regulation or 
exemption from regulation of one or more persons engaged in the 
industry,”303 the regulatory circumstances from Simpson have 
generally not been applied expressly in the decisions of the Utilities 
Commission. As explained above, the Utilities Commission may have 
implicitly taken into account the “nature of the industry sought to be 
regulated,” since the Commission has generally provided greater 
protection for the electric industry,304 but the attention given to this 
regulatory circumstance prevents innovation in “essential” 
industries305 and precludes the type of case-by-case analysis endorsed 
by the court in Simpson. 
In light of the factors actually considered by the Utilities 
Commission in its previous decisions, statements by the court in 
Simpson supporting the case-by-case approach, and factors 
considered by courts in other jurisdictions when determining whether 
to regulate an individual or entity as a public utility, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina should replace the regulatory circumstances 
from Simpson with the following factors: (1) the nature of the 
proposed transaction(s); (2) the impact on the public of regulation or 
non-regulation; (3) the impact on the incumbent public utility of 
regulation or non-regulation; and (4) declarations of public policy by 
the General Assembly that may affect the decision of whether or not 
to regulate the proposed transaction(s). 
The first factor, the nature of the proposed transaction, shifts the 
emphasis away from the nature of the industry (as called for by the 
first “regulatory circumstance” set forth in Simpson),306 and instead 
 
 302. An appeal of the Utilities Commission’s NC WARN decision is currently pending 
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 306. Simpson, 295 N.C. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756. 
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focuses attention on the transaction itself. Several aspects of the 
proposed transaction may be relevant in determining whether the 
Utilities Commission should step in to regulate. For example, with 
respect to a power purchase agreement, this factor would consider 
whether the PPA is intended as a means for selling electricity or 
instead is meant to be a method for financing a solar PV system.307 
This factor would also examine whether the proposed transaction 
is “bargained for” between the parties, thereby indicating that the 
parties have comparable bargaining power.308 If so, there is less need 
for regulation based on concerns about consumer protection. 
Analyzing the nature of the transaction would further allow for 
consideration of issues such as (i) whether the proposed transaction 
involves an indispensable commodity;309 (ii) whether the proposed 
transaction will result in waste or duplication of resources;310 and (iii) 
whether the consumer will continue to receive service from the 
incumbent utility.311 All of these issues have been considered by the 
North Carolina Utilities Commission, as well as other states’ 
regulators and courts, but are not part of the regulatory circumstances 
listed in Simpson. 
The second proposed factor, the impact on the public of 
regulation or non-regulation of the proposed transaction, is intended 
to focus attention on the fact that regulation of public utilities is 
meant to serve the interest of consumers, not to ensure maximum 
profit to the public utility.312 The North Carolina Utilities Commission 
did address the impact of the proposed transaction on the public in its 
NC WARN decision, but the Commission’s analysis was based on 
theoretical speculation and empirical evidence about how PPAs affect 
electricity pricing from states that have permitted PPAs was not 
considered by the Commission in its assessment. 
 
 307. This aspect of the nature of the proposed transaction was discussed under the first 
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Further, while the Utilities Commission speculated in NC 
WARN about the potential cost increases for those consumers who do 
not enter into PPAs, the Commission ignored the very real economic 
benefit that would be enjoyed by lower-income consumers, like Faith 
Community Church, if they were allowed to enter into power 
purchase agreements. The only certain price effect from the NC 
WARN decision was that Faith Community Church will pay more for 
its electricity because the PPA was struck down. 
The third factor—impact of regulation or non-regulation on the 
incumbent public utility—recognizes the “traditional regulatory 
bargain” between public utilities and the state: public utilities 
exchange the “benefit of monopoly franchised service territory for 
[the] obligation to provide adequate service at reasonable rates.”313 
The competitive monopoly granted to public utilities is not absolute, 
however, as illustrated by the self-generation exception to the 
definition of “public utility” in North Carolina and the Utilities 
Commission’s allowance of the use of electricity generated by a third 
party to produce lighting in its Progress Solar decision.314 Other state 
regulators have been more explicit in recognizing that the competitive 
monopoly offered to public utilities does not preclude all sales by 
third parties.315 As discussed above, the North Carolina Utilities 
Commission’s previous decisions seem to indicate that some—just not 
too much—competition is permitted vis-à-vis public utilities. 
Consistent with its analysis of the impact on consumers, the 
Utilities Commission in NC WARN theorized that allowing PPAs in 
the State would result in “cherry picking,” which could result in less 
revenue for the utility and higher prices for consumers who did not 
enter into PPAs.316 As previously stated, this analysis failed to 
consider evidence of the impact of PPAs on public utilities in states 
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that have allowed use of the agreements.317 As stated by the Iowa 
Supreme Court in SZ Enterprises, 
[c]ertainly, the case can be made that if Eagle Point is allowed 
to “cream skim” the most profitable customers, there may be 
impacts on the regulated utility.	.	.	. There is nothing in the 
record of this administrative proceeding, however, to gauge the 
likelihood or degree of material impact, and there was no 
suggestion that the integrity of the grid or economic health of 
regulated providers has been adversely affected in states such 
as California, Nevada, Arizona, and Colorado, where third-
party PPAs are not considered public utilities for purposes of 
regulation.318 
Thus, the impact on the public and the impact on public utilities 
are interrelated questions. The analysis of both should be based, 
whenever possible, on empirical information. With respect to power 
purchase agreements, that empirical information exists because 
several states have already permitted the use of PPAs.319 Given the 
information currently available from those states, it does not appear 
that consumers or public utilities have been adversely affected by the 
use of PPAs.320 
The final consideration to determine whether to regulate a 
proposed transaction is whether the legislature has made any relevant 
public policy pronouncements. As stated in Simpson, the 
determination of whether to regulate must “in the final analysis” 
accomplish “the legislature’s purpose and comport[] with its public 
policy.”321 Despite this statement in Simpson, the Utilities 
Commission’s analysis in NC WARN never mentioned the express 
public policies enacted in North Carolina favoring the development of 
renewable energy resources. Therefore, the Commission ignored the 
General Assembly’s stated public policy to use “the entire spectrum of 
demand-side options, including but not limited to conservation, load 
management and efficiency programs, as additional sources of energy 
supply and/or energy demand reductions.”322 In addition, the statute 
establishing the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio 
Standards provides that one of the purposes of the Standards is to 
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“[e]ncourage private investment in renewable energy and energy 
efficiency.”323 These statutory pronouncements may not directly 
answer the question of whether PPAs should be permitted in North 
Carolina, but they demonstrate a clear public policy favoring the 
development and expansion of renewable energy resources. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was correct in 
Simpson when it stated that flexibility is required when assessing 
whether to regulate a proposed transaction so as to “comport 
legislative purpose with the variable nature of modern technology.”324 
The factors set forth above allow for that type of flexibility. They also 
support the case-by-case approach espoused by the court in Simpson 
but hampered by Simpson’s focus on “the nature of the industry 
sought to be regulated.”325 By moving attention away from the nature 
of the industry and focusing instead on the nature of the transaction, 
the proposed standard allows for greater innovation within the 
electric industry and other regulated industries. 
CONCLUSION 
North Carolina is one of the few states that has expressly 
prohibited PPAs.326 In its NC WARN decision, the Utilities 
Commission based its prohibition against power purchase agreements 
on a concern over the potential increased cost that could result to 
some consumers if PPAs were permitted in the state. Specifically, the 
Utilities Commission was concerned that if organizations like NC 
WARN were not treated as public utilities and regulated by the 
Commission, these organizations would “cherry pick” the most 
lucrative customers from the public utility, leaving the public utility 
with only the most costly customers to serve. Public utilities are 
required to provide adequate service to all those within their 
exclusive territory,327 and cannot discriminate between lucrative and 
costly customers.328 Consequently, the Utilities Commission feared 
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that allowing the more lucrative customers to reduce their reliance on 
the public utility by entering into PPAs for lower-cost, solar-
generated electricity would ultimately leave the public utility serving 
fewer and more costly customers. This, in turn, would result in higher 
prices for those consumers continuing to receive their electricity 
exclusively from the public utility. 
Ironically, given its concern about the higher cost of electricity 
from permitting PPAs, the Utilities Commission’s decision actually 
prevents consumers like Faith Community Church, which are not able 
to self-finance solar PV systems, from receiving the lower-cost 
electricity that solar PV systems could provide. The prohibition 
against PPAs also fails to account for the fact that other states have 
already permitted this type of arrangement without the adverse 
consequences to the cost of electricity that served as the basis of the 
Utilities Commission’s decision.329 Experience shows that states that 
have expressly allowed PPAs have generally seen changes in the cost 
of electricity consistent with the rest of the nation. Thus, the decision 
to prohibit PPAs precludes lower-income consumers from accessing 
the benefit of lower-cost solar energy that they would otherwise enjoy 
and serves to protect against cost increases that appear unlikely to 
actually occur. If North Carolina hopes to move towards more 
equitable access to renewable energy resources, either the General 
Assembly or the Supreme Court of North Carolina should act to 
permit third-party financing for distributed solar PV systems. 
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